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Abstract 
Three essays in this dissertation empirically investigate the impact of US farm 
subsidies (or production subsidies) on US farm trade (agricultural plus livestock 
products). US is the world leading exporter and importer in the agricultural sector, as 
well as the most intensive subsidy user with its subsidy payments exceeding the 
value of production in many years. Consequently, its subsidy policies have attracted 
significant attention from around the globe and caused a huge debate among the 
WTO members. With disciplines in agriculture subsidies being brought as a central 
point of Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the effects of US subsidies on its trade 
are central to understand given their crucial implications for trade negotiators and 
policy makers in Doha rounds.  
Throughout the three essays, I assess the impact of US farm subsidies on its 
farm trade using the variation in trade and subsidies at the state level. The first and 
second essay (chapters 2 and 3) seek to determine the extent to which subsidies affect 
exports and imports, respectively, while the final essay (chapter 4) investigates the 
impact of subsidies on exports for cotton. The main methodology used throughout 
the thesis is the gravity model of trade, for which success and power is strongly 
evidenced in the literature. The trade data cover 46 US states and their 100 biggest 
trading partners, which account for roughly 98% of US total trade of all merchandise 
(sum of exports and imports). Trade data are extracted from USA trade online while 
subsidy data are collected from the Environmental Working Group’s Farm Subsidy 
Database (EWG).  
Chapter 2 quantifies the effect of farm subsidies on farm exports during 
1999-2011. As subsidy programs are largely paid on production, simultaneity bias is 
a highly likely problem in our sample. States with a larger volume of production 
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receive a greater amount of subsidies, but the relationship is not necessarily causal. 
The problem raised by some researchers in identifying the effect is that it is not clear 
whether subsidies induce higher production or a state produces more and receives 
more subsidies.  Specifically, programs like Direct Payment (DP) are paid on 
historical production and also do not depend on current market conditions and hence 
vary little over time. This would make it highly and positively correlate with a 
permanent state fixed effect and hence would create upward bias if the permanent 
differences are not controlled for. In addition, the government may target states with 
higher capacity of agricultural production in policy design, so states that perform 
consistently better in the agricultural sector would receive higher subsidies. To 
address potential bias caused by endogeneity, we utilize panel data for a reasonably 
long period in which within-state variation is used to identify the effect. In addition, 
other programs, including disaster payment and crop insurance, inversely correlate 
with production and are normally similar for a region; therefore, we include region-
by-year dummies to minimize the bias from time-varying omitted variables. Also, we 
control for the vector of covariates in the standard gravity model. The estimate 
demonstrates that subsidies have a large and significant impact on US exports. More 
importantly, programs that are paid on current production and/or contingent on 
market conditions, such as marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments (LDPs), 
and counter-cyclical payment (CCPs), which are assigned to amber box payment and 
subjected to limitations according to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) 
regulations, are the main source of distortion. To be specific, a 10% decrease in 
subsidies would lead to 0.9%-1.5% reduction in farm exports. In addition, DP, which 
is paid on historical production, does not promote exports. Consistent with most 
important subsidy programs accruing to crop production, the subsidy effect is large 
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for agricultural exports (crop products) but not for livestock products. The results are 
robust to a number of robustness checks, including potential time-varying omitted 
variables and different versions of the gravity model. 
In chapter 3, I explore the effect of subsidies on farm imports to obtain a 
more complete view of the impact of subsidies on US international trade. As import 
data are only available for short time periods (4 years), a state fixed effects estimate 
is inaccurate with large standard error. We use the same specification as in chapter 1 
but without state fixed effects and keeping in mind the potential bias when 
explaining the effect given the analysis and finding from chapter 1 that the bias due 
to omitting state-specific factors applies for DP and might also for CCP to a lesser 
extent. In addition, we explore one potential channel through which subsidies may 
affect trade by including the average of subsidies, which may be present for farm 
size or farm productivity. As zero observations account for a large part of imports 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) may cause large bias as highlighted in the 
literature, we use the Eaton-Tamura (ET) tobit model to address the problem of 
frequent zero import flows. The results document that the effect of subsidy on 
imports, though not as strong as the effect on exports, is meaningful and significant. 
Again, programs that are directly calculated based on current production and/or link 
to market price, including marketing loan gain, commodity certificate, LDP, and 
CCP, are the main cause of the effect. In addition, the impact is larger for large farms 
than their small farm counterparts, suggesting that the wealth effect or coupling 
effect exists. Meanwhile, DP, crop insurance, disaster, and the Conservation Reserve 
Program have only a small impact on imports through large farms. 
Finally, I assess the impact of subsidies on exports for cotton (chapter 4). US 
support for cotton is the world’s largest and is alleged to depress world prices and 
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harm competitors. In fact, Brazil, a major cotton producer and exporter, brought a 
legal challenge to the US cotton subsidization to the WTO in late 2002. I investigate 
the impact of subsidies on cotton exports to see how the effect varies under a 
changing environment. The gravity model used in this chapter is exactly the same as 
in chapter 1. However, instead of using state fixed effects, we use first differencing 
with a base year of 2002 and any year from 2003 to 2012 as the final year. As the 
cotton subsidy policy is challenged and under threat of reform, the anticipation of 
farmers plays an important role in growing decisions or, in other words, using the 
realized subsidy payment would lead to a problem of error-in-variables. Several 
subsidy programs, such as CCP and LDP, which hinge on market price at harvest 
time, which is unknown to producers at cultivation time, also contribute to the 
problem of error-in-variables. I address this problem by employing an instrumental 
variable. The subsidy payments in 1997 which were free from expectation error from 
both sources offer a unique tool to address the problem. The results demonstrate that 
in periods when the subsidy policy is stable and not likely to change (e.g. 2002-2003 
or 2011), the effect of subsidies is substantial. The rate of reduction in cotton export 
is more than twice that of subsidies before the dispute was perceived and almost 
equal in 2011, when the US-Brazil mutual agreement confirmed that the cotton 
subsidy policy would not change. From 2004-2010 and in 2012 when the cotton 
subsidy policy has a disadvantageous status or is likely to change, the effect drops in 
size and becomes statistically insignificant. 
In short, our findings indicate that US domestic subsidies promote exports 
and impede imports at the same time. The evidence is demonstrated through 
aggregate data, for individual programs, and for an individual commodity. In 
addition, programs that link to market conditions and are subjected to limitations 
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under the WTO’s regulations are the most distorting programs while the others have 
little effect. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Agriculture is the main focus of the ongoing negotiations of the Doha Round which 
started in 2001. For decades following the creation of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 agriculture had not been included in the 
multilateral trade talks. Agricultural protection by GATT/WTO members especially 
developed economies such as the US, Japan and the European Union had increased 
substantially over time. Consequently, although agricultural GDP and trade have 
accounted for a small and declining fraction of the global GDP and total trade, the 
protection in this sector is much higher. For example, while average applied import 
tariff for all merchandise is 5.2% that figure for food and agriculture is over 3 times 
higher (Anderson and Martin 2006). Although import tariffs imposed by developed 
countries are not as high as the remaining region, producer support policy such as 
export subsidy and domestic subsidy has been long and frequently undertaken by 
these nations.  
Table 1.1 reports the data for producer support estimate (PSE)1 and domestic 
support in million US dollar for OECD countries averaging from 1995-2011. It can 
be seen that the EU, Japan and the US are three biggest users of producer support 
estimate. However, while the EU and Japan spend a larger amount of their aids on 
border support (market price support), the US mainly focuses on domestic support 
which accounts for approximate 70% of its PSE. The U.S hence becomes the most 
                                                 
1 PSE is an index indicating the total annual support transferring to producers. It includes border 
support (or market price support) which measured by the difference between border price and 
domestic price at farm gate level, and all type of domestic supports to farmers. 
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significant user of domestic support given that the EU includes a number of 
members. 
Table 1.1: PSE and domestic support by OECD countries in million USD 
Country Domestic Support Producer Support Estimate 
Australia 965.941 1135.85 
Canada 2570.24 5142.375 
Chile 171.875 375.192 
European Union 63405.65 111881.1 
Iceland 85.241 166.842 
Israel 196.775 676.609 
Japan 6327.929 49166.9 
Korea 1534.272 19260.37 
Mexico 3117.145 5314.053 
New Zealand 23.39754 65.786 
Norway 1693.505 2979.801 
Switzerland 2466.605 5242.295 
Turkey 2594.749 12111.79 
United States 25868.64 37139.68 
Source: author’s calculation using OECD’s PSE/CSE database  
It is well known that protectionism causes a welfare loss for global economy 
as a whole because it distorts resource allocation. Despite its small fraction, 
agricultural protection has responsibility for 63% of forgone welfare of all 
merchandise (Hertel and Keeney, 2006). In addition, by driving down world price, 
subsidies by developed countries lowers competitive position of producers in non-
subsidised countries which mostly are developing and least developed countries. 
Although the impact of agricultural subsidies on global trade and welfare is not as 
significant as that from tariffs, the disciplines for subsidies are of importance beside 
tariff negotiations. The idea behind the need of subsidy disciplines is to prevent the 
use of this measure as an alternative for a possibly weaker protection from tariff 
barrier and to bring agriculture into line with other sector (Anderson and Martin 
2006). In this context, trade negotiation in agricultural sector emerges as a significant 
and relatively important issue. The turning point in multilateral negotiations in 
agricultural sector was from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) 
with the establishment of WTO in 1995. The URAA converted all the protection into 
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tariffs which are limited through tariffs binding. It might be the consequence of 
URAA, the producer support equivalence in OECD was roughly the same in 2001-03 
compared with that in 1986-88 though the support level was still high at $240 billion 
per year (Anderson and Martin 2006). In addition, the “decoupled” programs which 
were paid on planted area or historical acreage have gradually replaced price-
distorting programs. Although URAA had reached specific achievements, the 
agricultural trade liberalisation has been an on-going debate and kept discussing in 
current Doha Round whose framework is setting rules and disciplines for three 
pillars: market access, export subsidy and domestic subsidy. 
1.2. Research questions 
In theory, a production subsidy is used to promote domestic production and export. 
Yet, the impact of a domestic subsidy on production and trade is conditional on 
many factors such as the way the subsidy is offered, the structure of the world 
market of the product(s) to which the subsidy applies…etc. Empirical results hence 
provide important evidences for the trade negotiations in the current Doha round of 
multilateral trade talks. In addition, because different types of subsidy affect 
production and trade differently, there is a need to disentangle their effects on trade 
in order to identify which types of support are most distorting. This distinction is 
particularly important as under WTO disciplines, the total amber box support which 
measured in aggregate measure of support (AMS) is subjected to limit and reduction 
commitment while green box and blue box payment are exempt from reduction. 
Finally, not all commodities receive the equal amount of support; some specific 
crops receive a bulk of subsidy and hence cause long disputes in the international 
market. The cotton dispute between Brazil and the U.S started in 2004 is one 
example. Given the importance of these issues and after carefully reviewing existing 
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literature, the following research questions (a, b, c) are answered in chapter from 2 to 
4 respectively. 
a. To what extent do farm supports affect US states’ exports? What impacts do 
different program categories of farm subsidies (i.e., amber box, green box, 
Direct Payment...) have on US states’ exports?  
b. To what extent do farm supports affect US states’ imports? What impacts do 
different program categories of farm subsidies (i.e., Loan Deficiency 
Payment, Marketing Loan Gain, Commodity Certificate, Direct Payment...) 
have on US states’ imports? Does the effect vary with farm size? 
c. To what extent do cotton supports affect US states’ cotton exports? Do the 
cotton dispute and WTO settlement matter? 
 
1.3.  Rationale for the Research and Its Significance 
Bearing in mind that the question of farm subsidy by developed countries is 
frequently touched upon by policy makers and WTO negotiators, there have been 
few elaborate studies that look into the impact that farm subsidies may have on trade 
flows. One of the main reasons why the literature on this topic is scant is the lack of 
credible and comparable data on farm subsidies for a large number of countries. This 
thesis addresses the gap by empirically looking into the impact of US states’ farm 
subsidies on their trade flows, using data on US states’ farm subsidies, exports, and 
imports. Specifically, the US case is chosen for this thesis for two main reasons. 
First, there exist detailed and comparable data on trade and farms subsidies of US 
states for a long time span. Consequently, the study can be conducted not only at the 
aggregate but also disaggregate level of data. Second, the US is well known for its 
longest and most intensive use of domestic support with an average spending on 
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farm subsidy being approximate $17.21 billion per year. Further, the US spending on 
farm subsidy is likely to violate the WTO regulation of $19.1 billion cap on 
distortion, amber box subsidy under WTO agreement so its domestic subsidy needs 
to be cut most. For instance, the amount of distorting subsidy is $29.1 billion in 
2000, $25.3 billion in 2001 and being anticipated about $26.3 billion in 2006 
(Sumner, 2005). 
It is the aim of the thesis that the answers to the questions above will shed 
some lights on the impact of domestic subsidy on international trade in the US case. 
The finding of the thesis will have important policy implications for the ongoing 
WTO negotiations given that the US is one of the most important agricultural 
exporters and a major user of farm subsidies. 
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Chapter 2 
 Effects of US Farm Subsidies on Farm Exports 
2.1. Introduction 
The elimination of export subsidies and the reduction of domestic production 
subsidies have been at the very center of the ongoing Doha Round of trade talks 
since 2001. While World Trade Organization (WTO) developing and developed 
members recently agreed to remove export subsidies from agricultural exports by 
2018, the reduction or elimination of farm production subsidies in the near future 
seems to remain an impossible mission.2 For decades since promulgation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, trade barriers have been 
successfully brought down by a series of trade negotiations. However, because of its 
extremely contentious feature, the agricultural sector was ignored until the Uruguay 
Round in 1986 and did not receive adequate attention until the WTO was established 
in 1995. Consequently, global trade in agriculture is considered underdeveloped, 
which is reflected by the fact that the average applied import tariff rate for all 
merchandise is 5.2%, while this figure for agriculture is 16.7%. In addition, the 
export subsidies and domestic subsidies that have been frequently implemented by 
developed countries come at the expense of the competitiveness of producers in 
developing countries for whom agriculture is the main source of livelihood. 
Specifically, 88% of the total support comes from Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, while the remaining proportion is 
granted by developing countries (Hoekman et al., 2004). If the European Union (EU) 
                                                 
2 Specifically, in February 2016, 163 WTO members agreed in Nairobi, Kenya, to remove government export 
subsidies from agricultural products with developing countries agreeing to phase out subsidies in 2018. However, 
the agreement does nothing to address domestic agricultural subsidies used by the US and European Union, 
among others. It also does not address market access relating to restrictions on imported agricultural goods.  
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and Japan are well known for their export subsidies, the US is prominent for its 
domestic payments.3  
Given the controversial use of domestic subsidies by developed countries, a 
number of studies has assessed the impact of domestic subsidies on exports, imports, 
and welfare changes. Among them, Hertel and Keeney (2006) and Diao et al. (2001) 
estimate the impact of farm subsidies on global import and export values and welfare 
in comparison with the effect of tariffs. Meanwhile, Hoekman et al. (2004) and 
Dimaranan et al. (2004) shed light on the impact of agricultural support reform in 
developed countries on developing countries. Koo and Kennedy (2006) compare the 
impact on the global price, export, and welfare of border support typically carried out 
by the EU and the impact of domestic support frequently undertaken by the US. 
Dewbre et al. (2001) and Dewbre and Short (2002) evaluate the impact of different 
subsidy programs, specifically, market price support, output payments, area 
payments, and variable input payments, used by OECD countries for trade, in 
addition to production and income. The results show that purchased input support is 
the most trade-distorting, followed by market price support, with output payments 
coming third. The least trade-distorting is area payments, while historical payments 
are assumed to have no effect on trade. In sum, even if economists have explored 
questions relating to the impact of domestic subsidies, the empirical literature on the 
specific question of their trade effects remains very limited (Sumner, 2005).   
This study investigates the impact of farm subsidies on the farm exports 
(agricultural plus livestock exports) of US states. It makes several contributions to 
                                                 
3 The US has experienced a long history of producer support since the 1930s when financial support was granted 
to farmers to help overcome the Great Depression. Since then, farm subsidies have become a permanent 
component of agricultural and food policies, providing farmers with a safety net by reducing the risk of price 
volatility. The most important subsidy programs in the US include price support, loan rate payments, and 
payments based on crop area. Although price support was more important and initially accounted for a large US 
budget outlay, there has been a shift to “decoupled” payments to conform to WTO disciplines. 
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the related literature. First, it is the first study to examine the trade effects of US farm 
subsidies at the state level using the gravity model. Second, we address the problem 
of potential endogeneity of the subsidy policy to identify the effect of subsidy on 
exports by using the component of within-state variation in subsidy payments which 
takes place independently of the joint determination of state farm subsidies on one 
hand and state production and exports on the other. This joint determination 
characterizes subsidy programs under different US farm bills to varying degrees. It is 
important to note important features of the farm bills that constitute the US 
agricultural and food policy. On the one hand, the farm bills, once passed by the US 
Congress, are applied every five years or so. On the other, as we will explain in 
section 2, in a number of subsidy programs, payments are allocated to states based 
on their past production or region/year-specific factors such as weather and natural 
disaster. As a result, subsidy payments systematically covary with the production and 
export of states/regions. Failing to control for the endogeneity due to this joint 
determination of subsidy on one hand and production and export on the other will 
yield biased coefficient estimates of the effect of subsidy payments. It is our 
econometric strategy to exploit panel data and to include state dummies and 
region/year dummies to control for the endogenous component of variation in 
subsidy payments and use only the remaining component in within-state variation in 
subsidy payments to identify a meaningful effect of subsidy payments on exports.4 
Numerous tests of the feedback effect confirm that subsidization policy indeed is not 
based on previous trade performance and, consequently, provide strong support for 
                                                 
4 The exogeneity of policy has been questioned by many researchers. For example, Baier and Bergstrand (2007), 
among others, argue that free trade agreements (FTAs) between two parties are endogenous to their bilateral trade 
flow. Trade value between two trading partners is quintupled when the endogeneity of FTAs is taken into 
account. 
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our econometric strategy. Third, we identify exactly what programs cause trade 
distortion.  
The results document a robust and consistent distortionary impact of US 
domestic subsidies on its exports. After taking into account the potential endogeneity 
problem, our estimates suggest that a one percentage point decrease in subsidy 
payments leads to approximately a 0.15% decline in farm exports, which 
equivalently means that the complete removal of subsidy payments (i.e. 100% 
reduction in subsidies) results in a reduction of $5.73 billion in US annual exports. 
We document robust and consistent evidence that amber box subsidy payments such 
as CCPs and marketing assistance loans (MLs) indeed have the largest distorting 
effect on US state export while green box subsidy payments such as direct payment 
(DP) have only a very small and statistically insignificant effect. These findings 
clearly lend support to the WTO discipline suggesting that more than minimal 
production and trade-distorting programs need to be cut. Meanwhile, a stronger 
export promotion effect is confirmed among the commodities and crops for which 
subsidy payments are most concentrated. We also find that the positive effects of 
subsidy payments under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRI Act) 
2002 and the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR Act) of 1996 
are similar in magnitude while those of Farm Bill 2008 have decreased and 
sometimes been insignificant. The absence of a significant positive effect of subsidy 
payments under Farm Bill 2008 may be explained by the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis, which caused amber box subsidies to decrease much more than green box 
subsidies for that period.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides 
information on US farm bill and subsidy categorization. Section 2.3 presents the data 
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and descriptive statistics, and section 2.4 describes the empirical framework. Section 
2.5 discusses the empirical findings and robustness checks. Finally, section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2. US Farm Bill and Subsidy Categorization 
2.2.1. Overview of US Farm Bills throughout the Sample Period 
The support levels and support provisions of the US federal government for 
agricultural producers have been institutionalized in farm bills that are revised and 
updated every five years. The FAIR Act, known as the “production flexibility 
contract,” marked the most significant changes during this decade. Producers could 
freely plant crops except fruits and vegetables to be eligible for support. Moreover, 
subsidy payments were divorced from current production as the support calculation 
was based on historical production, known as base acreage and yield. The poor 
market conditions from 1998 through 2000, however, triggered an ad hoc market 
loss assistance payment. This program later became an official payment after Farm 
Bill 2002 under the name of counter-cyclical payments (CCPs). In addition, 
soybeans and other oilseeds were added as “covered commodities” in the FRSI Act 
of 2002.5 Also, farmers were allowed to change their reference period for base 
acreage and yield in the FRSI Act. Critics have argued that the opportunity to update 
the base acreage may trigger current production if farmers expect a similar updated 
base acreage and yield in the future. Farm Bill 2008 continued the previous farm bill 
with small adjustments in the subsidy rate for eligible crops. In addition, the average 
crop revenue election (ACAE), which is triggered when revenue falls below a 
                                                 
5 See section b for more detail about commodities that receive payments. 
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threshold, was introduced. Farmers can choose to enroll in either ACAE or CCP, but 
not both. 
2.2.2. US Categorization of Subsidies 
US farm subsidies are categorized into four programs: commodity, crop insurance, 
disaster payment, and conservation reserve. The commodity program is the largest 
and most important category, accounting for two thirds of total farm subsidies. This 
program includes DPs, CCPs,6 and marketing assistance loans (MLs) for crops and 
payments for dairy and sugar. Commodities eligible for DPs and CCPs are called 
“covered commodities” and include wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland 
cotton, rice, and pulse crops. Meanwhile, “loan commodities,” which include 
covered commodities plus extra long staple cotton, wool, mohair, honey, dried peas, 
lentils, and small chick peas, refer to commodities for which marketing assistance 
loans apply. To be eligible for commodity payments, farmers must “actively engage 
in farming,” meaning they must share the risks of producing crops. In addition, 
farmers must comply with certain environmental and land conservation measures, as 
well as planting flexibility rules. The DP is granted to covered commodities (except 
pulse crops) plus peanuts with a fixed rate based on historical entitlement. The CCP 
is delivered to covered commodities on base acreage, similar to the DP. However, 
the CCP is triggered when the market price (or revenue if referring to ACAE, which 
was introduced in Farm Bill 2008) falls below the setting price in the statute. 
Meanwhile, ML provides farmers with interim financing and, if market prices drop 
below the loan prices set in the statute, additional income supports are granted as 
loan deficiency payments (LDPs). Market loans are nonrecourse loans that allow 
                                                 
6 From 1996 to 2002, the term production flexibility contract (PFC) and market loss assistant payment (MLA) 
were used for DP and CCP, respectively. 
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farmers to borrow cash using their harvested crops as collateral when market prices 
of crops are low. Alternatively, if farmers sell their commodities at a price lower 
than the set loan price in the statute, they will receive support for the gap between the 
loan prices and market prices. Unlike DPs and CCPs, which are “decoupled” from 
production, MLs are linked to both market price and current production. 
Crop insurance programs help to reduce losses due to natural disasters and 
weather-related diseases. For insurable crops, farmers can choose to insure the yield 
level alone (for yield insurance) or they can choose the revenue level (yield times 
price) and pay a premium for the chosen level. The US government has spent an 
increasing amount of money for these programs with the hope that they can replace 
ad hoc disaster payments. These annual payments were $500 million in the 1980s, 
doubled after a decade, and since 2000 they have cost approximately $3.3 billion per 
annum. The majority of this fund is paid to farmers to support their payments for 
insurance coverage; approximately 370 crops and 80% of planted acreage in 2004 
had insurance coverage. 
Supplementing the crop insurance, disaster payments provide support to 
relieve losses on crops or livestock that are not eligible for crop insurance. If a crop 
experiences a loss of at least 50% compared with historical production, 55% of the 
market price payment for such crop will be granted. Although sharing a common 
purpose with crop insurance to help farmers with financial recovery, disaster 
payments are granted after losses occur.  
Finally, conservation reserve programs (CRPs) are delivered to encourage 
farmers to retire erodible lands. To receive payments, farmers must remove low-
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quality land from production and plant species that help to improve land quality and 
health.  
2.2.3.  US Subsidy Payments: Amber vs. Green Box Categories 
In WTO terminology, agricultural domestic subsidies are classified into three boxes: 
amber, blue, and green. Amber box supports are those relating to price support or 
production promotion and hence distort trade. An amber box payment becomes a 
blue box payment if it is accompanied by restrictions on production that can offset 
production stimulation to a reasonable degree. Meanwhile, a green box payment 
provides at most minimal trade and production distortion. Under WTO disciplines, 
amber box payments are limited and subject to reduction commitment, while blue 
and green box payments are exempt from reduction. In US farm assistance, disaster 
payments and payments under CRPs are classified into green boxes. Crop insurance 
programs are assigned to amber boxes as they reduce yield and price risks and these 
effects are known to farmers when they make their planting decisions. Regarding 
commodity programs, MLs and CCPs are categorized as amber box payments as 
these supports are related to market prices and/or current production. DP is related to 
neither market condition nor current production and is currently assigned to green 
box payments.  
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2.3.  Data Description and Summary of Statistics 
2.3.1.  Data Description 
This study uses data on farm exports7 of 46 US states and their 100 biggest trading 
partners, which account for 98% of the US total trade of all merchandise (sum of 
imports and exports). The sample spans 1999 through 2011. Alaska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia are excluded from the sample 
as their trade flows are negligible. These regions together make up less than 2% of 
total trade value. Annual data of bilateral export value for aggregate farm products as 
well as data on agricultural and livestock exports are collected from International 
Trade Administration (US Department of Commerce).  
Data on domestic subsidies per annum for each state at both the aggregate 
and disaggregate level in the same time period as for exports are obtained from the 
Farm Subsidy Database of the Environmental Working Group (EWG).8 Data on 
different subsidy programs used in this study include commodity, disaster, crop 
insurance, CRP, DP, and CCP.  
Gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita gross domestic product 
(GDPC) at the state level are derived from the US Department of Commerce (Bureau 
of Economic Analysis). Bilateral distance between one state and its trading partner is 
the flight distance between the two corresponding capital cities calculated by the 
author using the website Worldatlas. Data on land borders and the coastline of US 
states are collected from online sources such as Reference.  
                                                 
7 Farm exports include agricultural exports and livestock exports. Agricultural exports encompass crop and dairy 
products. 
8 The EWG database can be accessed via the following link: farm.ewg.org 
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2.3.2.  Descriptive Statistics 
Subsidy payments differ substantially across states. Figure 2.1, which illustrates the 
frequency of payments to states, shows that almost half of the states (23) receive less 
than $200 million annually. Meanwhile, 9 out of 46 states are granted from $200-
$400 million. This figure continues to decrease when the level of payments 
increases, leaving only three states with more than a $1.3 billion subsidy received per 
year. Likewise, substantial variation in subsidy payments across states is depicted in 
Figure 2.2.  
Importantly, the within-state variation of subsidy receipts is also large. Figure 
2.5 illustrates the within-state variation for six selected states with different ranking 
in subsidy receipt.  Iowa and Texas top the list while Florida and Idaho stand in the 
middle, and Rhode Island and New Hampshire are at the bottom. Subsidy payments 
vary substantially over time and the pattern of variation is also very different 
between these states. Rhode Island, for example, received a tiny subsidy in 2011 and 
2001, while the payment was around 13 times bigger in 2008 and 2005. In contrast, 
Texas has consistently received a large amount of support over time, with the 
maximum value in 1999 being only twice as large as the minimum value in 2010.  
Similarly there is a substantial variation in export value both across states and 
within-state overtime. The variation in mean value of exports and distribution of 
these values across states is illustrated in Figure 2.3-2.4 while within state variation 
of exports for previous six selected states is reflected in Figure 2.6. For summary 
statistics of the main covariates used in this paper, see Table 1.1. 
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2.4. Empirical Framework: The Gravity Model 
2.4.1. Standard Gravity Model  
The method used in this paper is the gravity equation. First introduced by Tinbergen 
(1962), the gravity equation has been the most important empirical model for 
explaining the volume (value) of bilateral trade. This model has successfully 
explained the trade flow when applied to different trade datasets.9  
The baseline econometric specification used in this paper is as follows: 
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where ijtEX  is export value from state i to importer j in year t; itSubsidy  is the 
subsidy value granted for state i in year t; itGDP is states’ GDP; ijBorder  is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if state i and importer j share a land border and 0 otherwise; and 
iCoastline  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for states having a coastline and 0 
otherwise.10 Distanceij is the bilateral distance between the capital city of a state and 
its trading partner and represents the transaction cost. In the gravity regressions 
above, ajt, is a vector of importer by year dummies included to control for importers’ 
characteristics over time. This obviates the demand to use data on basic gravity 
model variables for the importers’ side, especially data on the subsidy granted by 
importer countries. If justification for the domestic subsidy is similar to that for the 
                                                 
9 The empirical success of the gravity model has also motivated trade theorists to set up theoretical models from 
which some form of the gravity equation is derived. The theoretical foundation of the gravity model was first 
established by Anderson (1979). It was then expanded by Bergstrand (1989, 1990) and Deardorff (1985, 1998) 
through the addition of the monopolistic competition or Hecksher-Ohline structure to explain specialization. In 
addition, the gravity equation is consistent with both standard trade models based on perfect competition 
(Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998) and new trade models based on imperfect competition and economies of 
scale (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). 
10 In the gravity literature, Log(Subsidyit) can be considered a part of the bilateral trade costs of the gravity 
equation. 
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export subsidy, Anania, Bohman, and Carter (1992) argue: “A final theoretical 
argument for export subsidies is … the intent of reducing other exporter subsidies” 
(p. 535); not controlling for importers’ subsidy in the model would bias estimates of 
the US subsidy downward. However, the quality and credibility of data on the 
subsidy of other countries are questionable due to a number of missing observations 
and inaccurate notifications (Nuetah et al., 2011). Furthermore, importer-year 
interaction dummies also account for “multilateral resistance” from the importer 
side. Failing to control for this price index will bias gravity coefficient estimates 
(Anderson and Vanwincoop, 2003).11  
 
2.4.2. Endogeneity Problem and Fixed-Effect Gravity Model 
In the absence of endogeneity of subsidy payments, the baseline gravity equation 
yields an unbiased estimate of the effect of subsidy payments on exports. In the case 
of US farm bills, the endogeneity occurs as a result of the joint determination of the 
subsidy payments of different programs on one hand and production and exports of 
US states on the other.12 In other words, payments of subsidy programs are allocated 
based on production and exports of US states to a large extent. The first source of 
simultaneity bias is that some subsidy programs such as DPs and to some extent 
CCPs are paid on historical entitlements or planting acreage and yields, which are 
                                                 
11 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out that the bilateral trade between country i and country j depends 
not only on the two countries’ characteristics such as their GDPs and the characteristics specific to the pair such 
as the bilateral distance between them, but also on the resistance between each country and the rest of the world. 
The larger the resistance between the two countries to the rest of the word, the more they trade with each other, 
keeping everything else constant. This resistance is called “multilateral resistance” or the multilateral price index 
and is a nonlinear function of the right-hand-side variables. Multilateral resistance, therefore, has a correlation 
with independent variables in the gravity model. This implies that omission of multilateral resistance in 
estimating the gravity model can result in biased gravity estimates. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that 
the price index can be estimated by country fixed effects for cross-sectional data and by country year interaction 
dummies in panel data. 
12 The simultaneity bias is also acknowledged and highlighted in Goodwin and Mishra (2006). According to the 
authors, without repeated information (panel data) at the farm level, a potential highly positive correlation 
between both current planting acreage and Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payment with historical 
planting acreage leads to a stronger effect of PFC payment on acreage expansion. 
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state specific and on average do not change from one year to another.13 This 
argument is supported by the evidence that larger states are also the larger recipients 
of subsidy payments and that the relative ranking of states in receiving subsidies 
changes little over time. For example, Illinois, Texas, and Iowa are among the top 
five largest recipients for every single year in the investigated time period (13 years). 
At the same time, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Hawaii are among the five that 
received the smallest amount of support in almost all years. It is important to note 
that this source of endogeneity results in a positive time-invariant correlation 
between subsidies and exports. In other words, states with larger agricultural 
production and exports on average receive more subsidy for the whole period of our 
sample. We can address this time-invariant endogeneity by including the state fixed 
effects in gravity specification (2) below:  
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Since we have covariance (Log(Subsidyit, bi) >0, we expect that the effect of subsidy 
payments on exports (i.e. α1) using gravity specification (1) is likely to be greater 
than the effect of subsidy using gravity specification (2).   
The second source of endogeneity due to simultaneity bias comes from the 
way subsidies are allocated to states under crop insurance, disaster, and conservation 
reserve programs. As explained in section 2, these programs are characterized by a 
common feature: Subsidy payments on average negatively correlate with production 
and exports of US states that belong to regions with similar natural and weather 
conditions. For example, under crop insurance and disaster programs, farmers who 
                                                 
13 Note that subsidy payments under CCP for a commodity are issued only when the target price exceeds its 
effective price for the commodity.  
As a result, the positive time-invariant correlation between state subsidy and state export under CCP is likely to 
be weaker than the time-invariant correlation between state subsidy and state export under DP.  
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suffered losses due to weather or disaster and consequently whose production 
decreased in a year are eligible to receive subsidy support.14 Similarly, those farmers 
who decide to remove their land at high risk of erosion from agricultural production 
in a year may also be admitted to the CRP and receive support. It is evident that 
factors such as weather, disaster, and soil erosion that influence farm production, and 
consequently the subsidy payments under crop insurance, disaster, and conservation 
reserve programs, are not specific to states but rather to regions and are likely to vary 
from one year to another. The reason is that natural disasters affect farms in the same 
way if the farms are similar in characteristics and located in regions sharing the same 
weather conditions. The joint determination of subsidy payments and production and 
export results in a negative correlation between the former and the latter. Failing to 
control for this source of endogeneity yields a biased estimate of the effect of 
subsidy payments on exports. To address this endogeneity issue, we include the 
region-year dummies (crt) in our gravity equation to control for the aforementioned 
region-year-based variation in subsidy payments that endogenously correlate with 
the production and export of US states. Regions used in this study are farm resource 
regions (FRRs) constructed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
It is important to point out that each of these regions consists of areas that have 
similar types of farms as wells as similar physiographic, soil, and climatic traits 
(USDA, 2000).  A state may contain counties which belong to different regions. In 
this situation, we assign that state to a region which encompasses the largest number 
                                                 
14 Note that to receive subsidy payments under the crop insurance program, farmers must purchase insurance 
policies. To the extent that farmers in different states/regions do not systematically differ in their attitudes toward 
risk, we expect subsidy payments under the crop insurance program and crop production and export at the state 
level to correlate negatively on average. Note that participation in the crop insurance program increased 
significantly following enactment of the 1994 Act, which made participation in the crop insurance program 
mandatory for farmers to be eligible for deficiency payments under price support programs, certain loans, and 
other benefits. Congress repealed this mandatory requirement in 1996. According to the USDA National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, in 1998, farmers in about two thirds of US total planted acreage of field crops 
purchased insurance policies under the program.  
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of counties.15 The gravity specification that addresses both sources of time-invariant 
and time-variant endogenous variation in subsidy is the following:16 
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Gravity specification (3) is our preferred empirical specification to identify the effect 
of subsidy on export. The inclusion of both state dummies and region-year dummies 
purges any potential endogenous variation in subsidy under the four different 
programs of farm support.17 Thus, the identification of the effects of subsidy on 
export in gravity specification (3) is based on the remaining within-state variation in 
subsidy that takes places independently of the joint determination of state subsidy 
and state production and export prescribed by different subsidy programs and is 
likely to be exogenous.  If the endogeneity due to the joint determination of farm 
production and export and subsidy payments under crop insurance, disaster, and 
conservation reserve programs is present, we must have covariance (Log(Subsidyit, 
crt) <0. Consequently, we expect that the effect of subsidy payments on exports (i.e. 
α1) using gravity specification (2) is smaller than the effect of subsidy payments 
using gravity specification (3).   
                                                 
15 Note that because of this rule no state is assigned to the Northern Great Plain. A brief description of the 
characteristics of FRRs by the USDA is presented in Appendix Table 1 while assignment of states to a region is 
reported in Appendix Table 2. Note that since Hawaii is not classified as a member of any (FRR constructed by 
the USDA, it is not included in our empirical analysis using gravity specification (3). This does not represent a 
major issue as Hawaii is a small state in terms of export performance and subsidy payments.  
16 Coastline is dropped owing to perfect multi-collinearity with state dummies. 
17 Endogeneity can be addressed by instrumenting subsidy value by a political variable which 
measures the influence of agricultural lobby. However such IV is not easy to find. Indeed I tried to 
use number of representatives in House Committee on Agriculture as IV. House Committee on 
Agriculture is the institution in charge of legislating omnibus farm bills. Thus the number of 
representatives in this institution may proxy for political power in agricultural sector for a state, so it 
is likely to have correlation with a state’ subsidy. However the representatives House Committee on 
Agriculture also can influence export subsidy and agricultural exports policy at the same time. 
Therefore this IV might be endogenous itself and does not satisfy the second requirement of a good 
instrument. 2sls IV estimate is very similar to OLS (not reported) suggesting that IV correlates with 
error as my earlier prediction. 
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2.5. Results and Analysis 
2.5.1. Overall Effect of Subsidies 
This section reports the results on the effects of farm subsidies on agricultural 
exports using gravity specifications (1) through (3). The results of the three gravity 
models need to be examined in relation to each other to provide insights into the 
endogeneity of subsidy policy and to qualify gravity specification (3) as our 
preferred econometric model. As explained earlier, these gravity specifications 
address the endogeneity of the subsidy policy to varying degrees. If endogeneity 
actually exists in the data, the differences in the results must be in line with our 
expectations. Note that given the existence of a positive correlation between subsidy 
payment under DPs and CCPs and farm production and exports, we expect that the 
estimate of subsidy effects from gravity specification (2) is smaller than the estimate 
of subsidy effects from gravity specification (1). It is also our expectation that the 
negative correlation between subsidy payments under crop insurance, disaster, and 
conservation reserve programs and farm production and exports is likely to result in 
the subsidy effects obtained from gravity specification (3) being greater than the 
subsidy effects obtained from gravity specification (2).    
Table 2.2 presents the results of gravity models (1) through (3) in columns (1) 
through (3), respectively.18 Gravity specification (1) performs really well with all the 
coefficient estimates having the expected sign and being statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Specifically, bilateral distance reduces exports while GDP of US states 
and the dummies on sharing land border and having coastline increase exports. 
                                                 
18 Due to zero exports, the number of observations drops to 29522 (the number of observations in the 
full sample is 59800). To deal with this this problem I replaced outcome by outcome plus 1 (so that ln 
of outcome can be calculated). The second way is to use Eaton-Tamura Tobit estimation. In both 
regressions, the coefficient of subsidy is around 0.2-0.3 and statistically significant at 1% level. So the 
estimate in this analysis is not likely to be downwardly estimated by using positive exports. 
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Gravity specifications (2) and (3) yield results presented in columns 2 and 3. These 
two models perform well, with only the seemingly counterintuitive result that GDP is 
found to reduce exports. Since GDP has been found to increase exports in the 
empirical literature using the gravity model, this result needs to be explained. It is 
important to note that in gravity models (2) and (3) we include state dummies and 
region-year dummies. Since the GDP of US states does not vary much from one year 
to another, it strongly correlates with those dummies. The quasi-multicollinearity 
between GDP and the dummies may have generated the counterintuitive result. 
When we exclude GDP from both gravity models (2) and (3), the coefficient 
estimates of other variables remain exactly the same. This finding clearly supports 
our claim that the strong multicollinearity between GDP and the dummies explains 
why GDP reduces exports.  
The results of gravity specifications (1) through (3) show that subsidy 
payments have a positive and statistically significant impact on exports. When there 
is no control for the endogeneity due to the joint determination of subsidy payments 
and farm production and exports under different subsidy programs, the effect of 
subsidies on exports obtained from gravity specification (1) is 0.651. Using gravity 
specification (2), which controls for time-invariant endogenous variation in subsidy 
payments as a result of the positive correlation between subsidies and farm 
production and exports under DPs and CCPs, we find that the elasticity of exports to 
subsidies is much lower and equal to 0.119. This finding is consistent with our 
argument that the first source of endogeneity is the time-invariant positive 
correlation between state subsidy and state export under DPs and CCPs and that 
without addressing this source of endogeneity gravity specification (1) is likely to 
overestimate the effect of subsidies on exports. Column (3) of Table 2.2 shows that 
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the effect of subsidy from our preferred gravity model (3) is 0.153. Again, the 
difference in the estimates of the effect of subsidies on exports from gravity models 
(2) and (3) is consistent with our expectation that the endogeneity due to the negative 
correlation between subsidies and farm production and exports under crop insurance, 
disaster, and conservation reserve programs is likely to cause the effect of subsidies 
to be underestimated in gravity model (2).  
The estimate indicates that a one percentage point decrease in subsidization 
for agriculture would reduce US agricultural exports by approximately 0.15%.19 
Equivalently, if US farm subsidization is abolished, its farm product export to the 
world market would decrease by 15% or $5.73 billion each year.20 This means that 
other countries, especially poor countries that depend heavily on agriculture for their 
economic development, would have better opportunities in terms of world market 
access.21  
In sum, the regression results obtained from gravity models (1) through (3) 
clearly support our argument that the endogeneity due to the joint determination of 
subsidy payments and farm production and export exists. The regression results also 
reveal that the endogeneity in the subsidy policy is mostly associated with cross-
                                                 
19 In these regressions subsidy value is not subtracted from GDP and it is expected that this should not 
affect the estimation results as subsidy amount accounts for only small portion compared with GDP. I 
also run regressions with subsidies excluded from GDP and the results stay the same as predicted. 
20 This figure is a result of multiplication of the US annual export value of $38.2 billion by 0.15. Note that $38.2 
billion is the volume of US annual exports we compute using our sample of exports by 46 US states to 100 
foreign destinations from 1999 through 2011. This number is much smaller than the volume of US annual 
agricultural exports (more than $100 billion US) provided by the USDA. The reason is that the USDA’s 
definition of agricultural products covers a larger range of products and includes US agricultural exports to all 
countries in the world. More details about the statistics of US agricultural exports and the list of agricultural 
products can be found at the following link: http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/foreign-agricultural-trade-of-
the-united-states-%28fatus%29/latest-us-agricultural-trade-data.aspx. 
21 Subsidy may affect exports in the form of extensive margin i.e the likelihood to exports. Probit with 
the covariates as in equation (3) shows that subsidy also has positive impact on likelihood to exports. 
The coefficient is 0.07 and statistically significant at 1% level. The regression results using 
specification (3) also indicate a positive impact of subsidy on export growth with magnitude of 0.12. 
Though the estimate is not statistically significant with t statistics is 1.25. Data limitation prevents us 
from answering questions such as whether the expansion of exports is due to existing farms or due to 
new farms starting to export; whether subsidies have effect on the number of products shipped 
internationally and the number of export destinations; or the potential effect of subsidies on inter-state 
trade. 
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sectional variation of subsidy payments under DPs and CCPs and to a lesser extent 
with region-year variation of subsidies under crop insurance, disaster, and 
conservation reserve programs. The regression results and their differences taken 
together qualify gravity model (3) as our preferred gravity specification.  
Next, I check whether the endogeneity of the subsidy policy matters for 
within-state estimations based on our preferred gravity model (3). In other words, we 
test whether there is evidence of endogeneity in within-state variation of subsidy 
after we control for the time-invariant and time-variant endogenous variation in 
subsidy under the four subsidy payment programs. Note that trade shock or trade 
performance may provide feedback for future subsidy changes. The existence of 
feedback effects attests to the existence of a reverse causal relationship. The 
requirement of no “feedback effect” is referred to as a “strict exogeneity” condition 
for fixed-effects estimation to be consistent. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 
285) and applied by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the future value of the variable of 
interest is added to the fixed-effects specification as a simple way to test for the 
“feedback effect.” If the remaining within-state variation in subsidy is strictly 
exogenous, then the future subsidy would not be related to concurrent trade value. 
The requirement of no feedback effect may be violated for a number of reasons. For 
example, the subsidization policy may be determined based on states’ export 
performance in the past. As a second reason, the producers may form their 
expectation that what happened with past farm bills may recur and act accordingly. 
For example, Farm Bill 2002 allows farmers to update their base for “decoupled” 
payments. If it is their expectation that similar changes will occur in future farm 
bills, they may produce more now to receive more subsidy later. Sumner (2005) 
mentions this scenario as an important question for empirical analysis. The 
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regression results shown in Table 2.2, column (4) show that the coefficient of the 
subsidy at time (t+1) is statistically not significant and not different from zero. Thus, 
the result provides no evidence supportive of the feedback effect hypothesis that 
farmers expand their current production in the hope of getting more future payment 
or that subsidization policy is based on previous trade performance. More 
importantly, endogeneity in the form of the feedback effect is unlikely to be a 
problem for our within-state estimation.  
2.5.2. Identifying the Effects of Different Subsidy Programs by US Categorization 
In this section, we look into the effects of commodity, crop insurance, disaster, and 
conservation reserve programs on exports. Commodity payments are the largest 
category and encompass programs that ensure a minimum market price such as CCP 
and loan deficiency payments or that provide a financing interim like a marketing 
loan gain. The export-promoting effect of this program is expected to be the largest. 
The results of our preferred gravity specification (3) are presented in Panel (A) of 
Table 2.3. Specifically, column 1 reveals that the commodity program is the major 
contributor to export promotion. The effect is at 0.098 and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The coefficient of disaster payments is small at 0.026 and statistically 
significant at only the 10% level while that of CRP is small, negative, and 
statistically insignificant. The effect of the crop insurance program is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that moral hazard may exist. When their crops 
are insured, farmers may have less incentive to prevent diseases or risk from 
occurring. In particular, they may use less risk-reducing input such as fertilizer and 
pesticides. This finding is in line with studies such as Roberts et al. (2006, 2011), 
who also found that the US crop insurance program resulted in moral hazard using 
fixed-effects regressions.   
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Next, we include the future values of subsidy payments of commodity and 
crop insurance programs in our preferred gravity equation to check whether feedback 
effects exist from exports to subsidy payments. Column 2 of Panel (A) shows that 
the effects of Log(Commodityi(t+1)) and Log(Crop Insurancei(t+1)) are not statistically 
different from zero.22 These results clearly confirm the exogeneity of the component 
of within-state variation in subsidy payments that takes place independently of the 
commodity and crop insurance programs and that is used in our gravity specification 
(3) to identify the effect of subsidy on exports.  
2.5.3. Identifying the Effects of Subsidies by WTO Categorization 
In accordance with WTO rules and terminology, the US assigns price and/or current 
production-related programs, including CCP and ML, to the amber box. At the same 
time, support for disaster relief or payments divorced from market conditions or 
current production such as DP is categorized into the green box. Programs that 
encourage farmers to retire low land quality (CRP) are also classified into the green 
box. It is obvious that amber box payments would distort trade and production the 
most while green box payments would have minimal if any effect. The availability of 
detailed information on program payment categorization enables us to verify the 
effect of subsidies on US exports. In Panel B of Table 2.3, we report the estimated 
effect of subsidies for the amber box and green box on exports using gravity 
specification (3). Specifically, column 1 shows that subsidy payments belonging to 
the amber box have a positive and statistically significant impact on exports. A one 
percentage point decrease in these payments reduces US exports by 0.078%. The 
impact of the amber box subsidy is smaller than that of the overall subsidy. This is 
likely because the amber subsidy covers a narrower range of commodities than the 
                                                 
22 The results remain the same when we include future value for all four sub-components of subsidy. These 
results are not reported to save space. 
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overall subsidies. Meanwhile, the green box effect estimate is negligible and 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
 To check the exogeneity of subsidy payments of the amber box, we now also 
include in gravity specification (3) the future value of the amber box payment. The 
results in column 2 of Panel (B) reveal that the effect of Log(Sub_Amberi(t+1)) is 
close to zero (i.e. 0.014) and statistically insignificant.23 In other words, there is no 
evidence that US states systematically adjust their exports today in anticipation of 
changes in subsidy payments of the amber box in the following year. Consequently, 
the effects of subsidy payments of the amber box we obtained from gravity 
specification (3) have nothing to do with the feedback effects from export changes 
for changes in subsidy payments.  
2.5.4. Subsidy Effects of the DP program 
In this section, we investigate the impact of the Direct Payment (DP) program on 
exports.24 DP was signed into law in the FAIR Act of 1996. As explained earlier, the 
DP is granted to cover commodities with a fixed rate based on historical entitlement. 
Although “decoupled” programs support farmers based on their crops’ historical 
yield and base acreage, their “minimal” impact on production and trade stimulates 
considerable controversy. According to Hennessy (1998), under the condition of 
uncertainty, if producers are risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA) preferences, an increase in wealth would reduce absolute risk aversion. 
Also, government payments help to reduce income variability, referred to as the 
insurance effect. As a consequence of wealth and the insurance effect, decoupled 
                                                 
23 The results are also unchanged when we include future value of both subsidy amber and subsidy green in the 
regression. 
24 Note that decoupled programs include not only DPs but also CCPs. Data of CCPs are available only for a short 
period, which prevents us from carrying out the same analysis as we do for DPs.   
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payments might encourage farmers to grow in a crop area which is too risky 
otherwise. In addition, if farmers face credit constraints, direct payments can affect 
their investment plans by promoting liquidity easement (Goodwin and Mishra, 2005, 
2006). Chau and de Gorter (2005) argue that direct payments can help cover fixed 
costs; thus, producers who would be forced to shut down otherwise can stay in 
business. Empirical studies on decoupled payments, though plenty, mainly focus on 
their production effect (Young, 2000; Burfisher et al., 2000; Adams et al., 2001; 
Antón and Le Mouël, 2004; El-Osta et al., 2004; Makki et al., 2005; Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2005, 2006; Ahearn et al., 2006; Serra et al., 2005, 2011; Mcintosh, 2007; 
Key and Roberts, 2009; Bhaskar and Beghin, 2010; Femenia et al., 2010; 
O’Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010). To our best knowledge, no study sheds light on 
the effect of decoupled payments on trade. Rather, in studies that distinguish the 
impact of different subsidy programs on trade, decoupled payments are absent or 
their effect is assumed to be zero (Dewbre et al., 2001; Diao et al., 2001). 
We now closely examine our previous claim that endogeneity of subsidy 
payment is mostly the cause of time-invariant differences between states, which 
visibly reflects in DP as this program payment is based on historical production and 
thus does not change much over time. To see how estimates change, we present 
results for gravity specifications (1) through (3) in two scenarios; one includes DP 
and the remaining payment (Subsidyit-DPit) and the other decomposes total subsidy 
into DP, subsidies in the amber box, and subsidies in the green box (excluding DP). 
These results are presented in Table 2.4, columns from (1) to (6). It is obvious that 
the magnitude of DP stands very high in gravity specification (1) at 0.557 and 0.581 
and is strongly statistically significant (column (1) and (4)), which is similar to the 
coefficient of total subsidy in gravity specification (1) in Table 2.2. The coefficient 
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of DP drops substantially and becomes not statistically different from zero in 
columns (2) and (5) when endogeneity caused by joint determination is addressed. 
On the contrary, estimates of subsidy after subtracting DP (column (2)) and 
subsidy_amber (column (5)) increase in magnitude and become statistically 
significant at the 1% level once permanent differences between states are controlled 
for. This is because some programs like ACAE are triggered when average farm 
yield or revenue falls below a threshold. States with higher agricultural production 
and exports normally have higher average farm yield, making state-specific factors 
negatively correlate with subsidy. Thus, the effect increases when these dummies are 
included. Like in the overall subsidy, factors associated with subsidies over time at 
the region level affect the magnitude and statistical level of estimates to a much 
lesser extent. 
Furthermore, in columns (7) and (8), we report results for our preferred 
gravity specification as in column (3) and (6), incorporating the interaction of the DP 
variable with state GDPs (i.e. Log(DPit)* Log(GDPit)). This is to explore whether 
any wealth effect exists. All the regression results indicate that DP has no 
statistically significant impact on exports, while amber box subsidy distorts exports 
the most. The results do not provide evidence supportive of the argument that the 
effect of the DP program on exports depends on the level of GDPs of US states. As 
previously, we include subsidy at time (t+1) in regressions in columns (3), (6), (7), 
and (8) to test for strict exogeneity. These results are presented in columns (9)-(12), 
respectively. Like before, there is no concern with endogeneity in our within-state 
estimation and all estimates of DP and other subsidy programs essentially stay 
unchanged.25 In sum, the regression results on the effects of the DP program on 
                                                 
25 Note that all estimates remain similar when we include the future value of all subsidy components. 
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exports are consistent with those on the production effect of decoupled payments; 
that is, the impact of DP is negligible. Our results are in line with the current 
categorization of DP in the green box.  
2.5.5. Effects of Subsidies on the Exports of Agricultural Commodities and Livestock 
To further examine the effect of subsidies on exports, we provide insight into the 
effect of subsidization on agricultural commodities (including all eligible crops and 
dairy) as one group and livestock as another. Almost all subsidy payments (more 
than 98%) go to the former group, leaving only a tiny proportion for the latter. In 
addition, support for the first group encompasses the major and most distorting 
program payments while livestock receives only disaster payments. The subsidy 
effect on exports, hence, is expected to be stronger for the first group. Table 2.5 
reports the estimation results for agricultural exports in comparison to livestock 
exports. As expected, the estimates indicate that the subsidy effect is driven by 
agricultural commodities while no effect is observed for livestock.  
2.5.6. Subsidy Effects on Exports Under Different Farm Bills 
As a general tendency, subsidization undertaken by developed countries has shifted 
toward programs that limit their distortion of production and trade to satisfy WTO 
regulations. The FAIR Act of 1996 significantly reformed the subsidization policy by 
divorcing the payment rate from current production and commodity prices. Ad hoc 
payments (MLAs) in the following years and the subsequent Farm Bill 2002 
legislated payments which again depended on market conditions.  Farm Bill 2008 
continued with few amendments from the previous farm bill, making the 
subsidization policy stable during this decade.  
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To see how the impact farm subsidies changes over the farm bills, we allow 
the subsidy coefficient to vary over different farm bill periods. In this case, the effect 
of subsidy is identified by using within-state variation over the years of each farm 
bill. The estimates of the effects on exports of different farm bills for total farm 
export, agricultural commodities, and livestock are presented in Table 2.6. The 
tendency is that the effect of the FSRI Act 2002 and the FAIR Act of 1996 is similar 
in magnitude while that of Farm Bill 2008 is smaller. The fact that high domestic 
prices due to the global 2007-2008 financial crisis deactivated price-triggered 
programs like marketing loan benefits may explain the lower impact of subsidy on 
export over this period.  
2.5.7. Robustness Checks 
In Bergstrand’s (1989, 1990) theoretical framework, GDP per capita (GDPC) 
represents specialization in production (i.e. whether production is labor-intensive or 
capital-intensive). On the other hand, GDPC may have a potential correlation with 
the subsidy level. This correlation may be negative if the US farm bills aim to 
support poor farmers, for example. Thus, to see whether estimates of the subsidy 
coefficients are driven by omitting this variable, we include it in the model. In 
addition, because GDP, GDPC, subsidy, and state dummies are also included in the 
model, it is likely that these variables have high multi-collinearity with each other. 
The clue regarding multi-collinearity is that GDP does not have the expected sign as 
indicated by theory (Anderson, 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). We, 
therefore, drop both GDP and GDPC to see if estimates are sensitive to potential 
multi-collinearity. Another way to reduce multi-collinearity is to use the export share 
(export value rescaled by GDP) instead of the export level. This is equivalent to 
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applying an assumption of unitary income elasticity, indicated by the theoretical 
work on the gravity model (Anderson, 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). We 
replicate all regressions in the main analysis for these scenarios using the most 
saturated specification (as in column (4), Table 2.2). Results from Table 2.2, Table 
2.3, and Table 2.5 are presented in Appendix Table A2.2. Meanwhile, estimates for 
the impact of the subsidy effect on decoupled payments and the impact over years 
and farm bills are reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A2.4, respectively. Overall, 
the results confirm the estimated effect in the main analysis for all regressions in all 
scenarios. In short, an overall subsidy effect has been found at 0.12-0.15 and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The commodity program and program 
payments in the amber box are the cause of export promotion. The effect of non-
distortionary programs such as CRP, disaster assistance, or those assigned to the 
green box is negligible. Meanwhile, DP does not affect exports as previously found. 
In addition, the effect of subsidy on exports is similar for Farm Bill 1996 and Farm 
Bill 2002 while a smaller effect has been observed for Farm Bill 2008. 
Although potential endogeneity bias sourced from states’ permanent 
characteristics and states’ export performance in past years have been taken into 
account when estimating subsidy effect there might be likelihood that subsidy policy 
may be endogenous to states’ export growth. Thus I augment the model by 
introducing state-specific time trend and relax the linear trend by including 
quadratic, cubic, and fourth order. The magnitude of subsidy effect goes up in all 
these specifications. Furthermore, although state heterogeneity and region-by-year 
indicators are taken into account in our model, time-variant omitted variables at the 
state level might matter. In this case, export subsidy programs are most likely the 
important candidates. This is because export subsidy programs are believed to 
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significantly promote exports and are subject to reductions under the WTO 
agreement. On the other hand, export subsidies might be used as a means to push 
excessive production resulting from domestic subsidies to the world market26 (Diao 
et al., 2001). If so, not controlling for this variable in the model would upwardly bias 
the coefficient of interest.  
The most important export promotion programs undertaken by the US 
include export credit guarantees (ECGs) and direct export subsidies, including the 
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP). 
ECGs support US exports from the demand side by providing specific importing 
countries with credit guarantees at prevailing and competitive interest rates when 
they purchase a US agricultural commodity. Meanwhile, direct export subsidies 
(EEP and DEIP) offer exporters bonuses for some target destinations. EEP is mainly 
for wheat and wheat flour, while DEIP assists with the export of dairy products. It is 
likely that direct export promotion programs have a direct and clearer correlation 
with farm subsidies at the state level. Failing to control for these covariates because 
data are unavailable would bias the coefficient of interest. Fortunately, after the last 
significant use of EEP in 1995, it was rarely used, and with only negligible 
payments, and repealed altogether in Farm Bill 2008. In contrast, DEIP was in force 
until 2013 with relatively large payments in some years. Although the omission of 
DEIP might have a significant impact on the export of dairy products, the potential 
effect in the aggregate regression, if any, is expected to be small. This is because the 
                                                 
26 This suspicion is especially relevant in our case when we find that the subsidy effect on exports has had a 
tendency to drop in recent years (from Farm Bill 2008), but its impact on production does not move in the same 
direction. The reduction in the subsidy impact on exports, which is not rooted in the accordingly smaller impact 
on production, might be associated with the removal of export-promoting instruments in the same time period 
(from 2008).  
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DEIP payment is relatively small compared to an aggregate subsidy. Even in fiscal 
years 2009 and 2002 when the largest amount of DEIP was delivered, payments 
account for, respectively, 0.376% and 0.207% of the annual average aggregate 
payment. There are no DEIP payments from 2005 to 2008, and these figures are 
negligible in the remaining years of the investigated period. To see whether the 
omitted DEIP variable affects the estimate of subsidies on exports, we perform two 
regressions. In the first regression, we exclude dairy exports and the dairy subsidy in 
the aggregate data while dropping the years 2002 and 2009 (when DEIP is 
substantial) in the second regression. In these two cases, we use the last specification 
as in column (4), Table 2.2. The estimate of the subsidy impact on exports is even 
higher at around 0.16 for these two regressions and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. These results indicate that time-varying omitted variables are not a major 
issue, as anticipated. 
To proceed we include on the right-hand side of the gravity specification the 
total factor productivity of US states.  In theoretical trade models like Eaton and 
Kortum (2002), the country-specific productivity level is also a determinant of a 
country’s exports. Farm subsidies may be allocated based on farmers’ productivity, 
resulting in a positive correlation between subsidy support received by states and 
their productivity in general. Not allowing for the productivity level of US states 
may result in omitted variable bias. The results show that, controlling for the state 
productivity level, the coefficient estimate of Log(Subsidyit) is 0.135 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.27 Thus, the effect of subsidy payments on state exports 
remains essentially the same. As a final robustness check we include sum of trade 
value of industries other than agriculture (in log form). In today’s global business, 
                                                 
27 The detailed results are not presented to save space. They are, however, available from the authors upon 
request.  
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many firms are linked via business organizations. If the particular state exports in 
many different sectors, it would be easier for the farm owners to access information 
on the procedures to export to different destinations. Although there is no potential 
linkage between trade in other sectors and subsidies I include this information in the 
model. As expected the coefficient of subsidy remains unchanged when adding trade 
in other sectors.28 
2.6.  Conclusions 
This study investigates a question that is at the very center of the ongoing WTO trade 
talks: the trade effects of farm subsidies. For more than 15 years, farm subsidies in 
developed countries such as the US, EU member states, and Japan have been a key 
stumbling block in the Doha negotiations. While this is an important and hotly 
contested question, the related empirical evidence is scarce in the literature. 
Accordingly, we examine the extent to which farm subsidies of US states influence 
their exports for the period of 1999 through 2011.  The US subsidy programs provide 
a major advantage for studying the export effects of farm subsidies because the 
country is both a top world exporter and the largest provider of farm subsidies. The 
US is well known to have a long history of intensively using subsidies to support its 
producers. Importantly, US subsidy payments vary substantially not only from one 
state to another but also from one year to another at the state level. This 
characterization of US subsidy programs allows us to design our econometric 
strategy to address the endogeneity due to the joint determination of state farm 
subsidies on one hand and state production and export on the other. Specifically, in 
our preferred gravity specification, we control for the endogenous variation in 
                                                 
28 One examiner suggests adding lag of dependent variable into the model. However, fixed effect with 
lag dependent variable yields bias estimate. This can be overcome by several ways as suggested in the 
literature, and could be incorporated in paper for publication purpose. 
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subsidy payments by including, among others, both state fixed effects and region-
year fixed effects. Thus, a meaningful trade effect of US farm subsidies is identified 
based on the component of within-state variation in subsidy payments that occurs 
independently of the joint determination of subsidy and export in US farm bills and 
that is likely to be exogenous. Numerous tests of the feedback effect indeed confirm 
that endogeneity in the subsidy policy is unlikely to be driving our results. Our 
analysis of the estimates of the impact of the US farm subsidies using different 
gravity specifications shows that differences in the estimates are perfectly in line 
with what we identify as the two major sources of endogeneity of US subsidy and 
US state exports. Taken together the tests and the expected differences in the 
estimates of the trade effects from different gravity specifications clearly lend 
credence to our econometric strategy.  
Our results indicate a robust, statistically and economically significant and 
positive impact of domestic subsidies on exports. Specifically, a 1% decrease in 
subsidy would reduce US exports by approximately 0.15%. Thus, abolishing 
domestic support would result in a reduction of US annual exports by about $5.73 
billion. Importantly, in line with the WTO categorization, we document that amber 
box subsidy payments (i.e. subsidies of programs that relate to current production 
decisions or interfere with market conditions) have the most distorting effect on US 
exports while the impact of green box subsidy payments such as DP is negligible. 
Similarly, the estimates of CRP and disaster programs are small at -0.052 and 0.026 
and statistically insignificant (CRP) or statistically at a low level (disaster). The 
estimated impact of green box payments, which basically lump these two programs 
together, is even smaller due to an offsetting effect as CRP and disaster payments 
affect production and trade in the opposite direction.  We also find that the subsidy 
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effect is driven by agricultural commodities, rather than livestock, where the former 
is the main target of distorting program payments.   
Last but not least, in addition to the overall effect, we also examine the 
subsidy impact over different farm bills. The estimates indicate that subsidy 
payments under the FSRI Act of 2002 and the FAIR Act of 1996 have the largest 
positive effect while this effect of subsidy on exports tends to substantially decrease 
in Farm Bill 2008. This finding may be explained by that fact that the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis caused amber box subsidies to decrease much more than green 
box subsidies for that period.  
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Figure 2.1: Variation in States’ Subsidies 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Distribution  of States’ Subsidy 
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Figure 2.3: Variation in States’ Exports 
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Figure 2.5: Subsidy Receipt over Time for Selected States 
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Figure 2.6: Exports over Time for Selected States 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics            
 Obs Mean Sd Min Max 
Log(Farm Exportsijt) 29522 13.067 2.738 7.706 22.305 
Log(Agri_Exportsijt) 26456 13.065 2.806 7.706 22.305 
Log(Livestock Exportsijt) 13545 11.647 2.113 7.706 19.189 
Log(Farm Exportsijt/GDPit) 29522 .716 2.7 -6.548 10.070 
Log(Distanceij) 59800 8.484 .524 5.498 9.389 
Log(GDPit) 59800 12.012 .964 9.847 14.383 
Log(GDPCit) 59800 10.572 .171 10.189 11.089 
Borderij 59800 .003 .057 0 1 
Coastlineij 59800 .478 .5 0 1 
Log(Subsidyit) 59800 18.695 1.822 12.203 21.719 
Log(Commodityit) 59800 17.836 2.355 8.103 21.598 
Log(Disasterit) 59700 15.844 1.984 9.224 20.314 
Log(Crop Insuranceit) 59800 16.629 2.027 10.646 20.282 
Log(Conservation Reserve it) 59500 16.728 1.691 9.247 19.375 
Log(Sub_Amberit) 59800 17.825 2.062 10.983 21.394 
Log(Sub_Greenit) 59800 18.015 1.755 11.471 21.007 
Log(DPit) 58200 17.113 2.278 9.296 20.355 
Log(Sub_Greenit-DPit) 59800 17.328 1.544 11.311 20.554 
Log(Subsidyit-DPit) 59800 18.432 1.739 12.129 21.496 
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Table 2.2: Effects of Subsidies on US State Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Subsidyit) 0.651*** 0.119*** 0.153** 0.159** 
 (25.19) (2.42) (2.45) (2.47) 
Log(Distanceij) -0.436*** -1.152*** -1.228*** -1.197*** 
 (3.38) (9.62) (10.25) (10.20) 
Log(GDPit) 0.325*** -0.333 -0.540 -0.684 
 (7.47) (0.93) (1.22) (1.42) 
Borderij 1.789*** 1.397*** 1.392*** 1.427*** 
 (5.26) (4.02) (3.96) (4.04) 
Coastlineij 1.512*** -- -- -- 
  (17.23) -- -- -- 
Log(Subsidyi(t+1))    0.0526 
    (0.85) 
Number of Obs. 29522 29522 29165 26764 
Adj. R2 0.389 0.496 0.497 0.495 
Gravity Specification Includes 
       ajt 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
       bi  No Yes Yes Yes 
      crt No No Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ajt, bi, and crt denote for importer year 
fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed effects respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Effects of US Subsidy Programs and US Subsidies by WTO Category  
(A)  U.S. Subsidy Program  (B) US Subsidies by WTO Category  
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Log(Commodityit)  0.098** 0.125***  Log(Sub_Amberit)  0.078** 0.094** 
 (1.98) (2.70)   (1.99) (2.43) 
Log (Disasterit) 0.0261* 0.019  Log(Sub_Greenit)  0.036 0.013 
 (1.90) (1.39)   (0.074) (0.24) 
Log(Conservation 
Reserveit) 
-0.0518 -0.0069  
   
 (1.39) (0.15)     
Log(Crop 
Insuranceit) 
-0.190*** -0. 149*  
   
 (2.58) (1.81)     
Log(Distanceij)  -1.224*** -1.191***  Log(Distanceij) s -1.228*** -1.197*** 
 (10.23) (10.16)   (10.25) (10.20) 
Log(GDPit) -0.494 -0.612  Log(GDPit) -0.499 -0.581 
 (1.13) (1.29)   (1.13) (1.22) 
Borderij 1.394*** 1.427***  Borderij 1.390*** 1.425*** 
 (3.95) (4.03)   (3.95) (4.02) 
Log(Commodityi(t+1))   0.025  Log(Sub_Amberi(t+1))   0.014 
  (0.52)    (0.36) 
Log(Crop 
Insurancei(t+1)) 
 -0.0315    
 
 
   (0.34)         
Number of 
Observation. 
29065 
26753 
    29165 26764 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.497 0.495     0.497 0.495 
Gravity Equation 
Includes 
  
 
Gravity Equation 
Includes 
      ajt 
  
      ajt Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      bi  Yes Yes        bi  Yes Yes 
      crt Yes Yes         crt Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ajt, bi, and crt denote for importer year 
fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed effects respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Effects of the DP Program on US State Exports  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(DPit) 0.557*** -0.114 -0.116 0.581*** -0.123 -0.118 
 (9.97) (1.05) (0.94) (10.07) (1.13) (0.95) 
Log(Subsidyit - DPit) -0.0146 0.113*** 0.117**    
 (0.22) (2.82) (2.33)    
Log(Distanceij) -0.536*** -1.231*** -1.233*** -0.521*** -1.232*** -1.233*** 
 (3.95) (10.19) (10.25) (3.78) (10.19) (10.25) 
Log(GDPit) 0.339*** -0.353 -0.530 0.334*** -0.331 -0.479 
 (8.35) (0.98) (1.20) (8.23) (0.93) (1.09) 
Borderij 1.764*** 1.400*** 1.394*** 1.774*** 1.397*** 1.392*** 
 (5.27) (4.00) (3.97) (5.31) (3.97) (3.95) 
Coastlinei 1.651***   1.655***   
 (18.74)   (18.74)   
Log(DPit)* Log(GDPit)       
       
Log(Sub_Amberit)    0.0105 0.116*** 0.0748* 
    (0.21) (3.89) (1.91) 
Log(Sub_Green2it)    -0.0741 -0.00638 0.00750 
    (1.56) (0.23) (0.24) 
Number of Observations 29121 29121 29121 29121 29121 29121 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.394 0.495 0.497 0.395 0.495 0.497 
Gravity Equation Includes       
      ajt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      bi  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
      crt No No Yes No No Yes 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log(DPit) -0.0690 -0.0771 -0.0950 -0.0973 -0.0516 -0.0647 
 (1.20) (1.33) (0.75) (0.76) (0.84) (1.06) 
Log(Subsidyit – DPit) 0.116**  0.134***  0.132**  
 (2.32)  (2.58)  (2.55)  
Log(Distanceij) -1.233*** -1.233*** -1.202*** -1.202*** -1.202*** -1.202*** 
 (10.25) (10.25) (10.20) (10.20) (10.20) (10.20) 
Log(GDPit) 0.715 0.912 -0.661 -0.538 0.270 0.627 
 (0.62) (0.79) (1.37) (1.13) (0.22) (0.51) 
Borderif 1.393*** 1.391*** 1.429*** 1.426*** 1.429*** 1.426*** 
 (3.97) (3.95) (4.05) (4.02) (4.05) (4.02) 
Coastlinei       
       
Log(DPit)* Log(GDPit) 0.708 0.802   0.519 0.673 
 (1.02) (1.15)   (0.70) (0.91) 
Log(Sub_Amberit)  0.0775**  0.0904**  0.0907** 
  (1.98)  (2.36)  (2.37) 
Log(Sub_Green2it)  0.00728  -0.0307  -0.0311 
  (0.23)  (0.83)  (0.84) 
Log(Subsidyi(t+1)- DPi(t+1))   0.0224  0.0219  
   (0.45)  (0.44)  
Log(Sub_Amberi(t+1))    0.0129  0.0139 
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     (0.32)  (0.34) 
Number of Observations 29121 29121 26720 26720 26720 26720 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.497 0.497 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 
Gravity Equation Includes       
      ajt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      bi  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      crt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ajt, bi, and crt denote for 
importer year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed effects respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Effects of Subsidies on US State Exports by Group of Commodities 
 Agricultural 
Commodities 
Agricultural 
Commodities 
 
Livestock 
 
Livestock 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Log(Subsidyit) 0.129* 0.168**   
 (1.92) (2.47)   
Log(Livestock_Subsidyit)   -0.0161 -0.0148 
   (1.35) (1.11) 
Log(Distanceij) -1.214*** -1.189*** -0.906*** -0.922*** 
 (9.71) (9.73) (6.37) (6.87) 
Log(GDPit) -0.0238 -0.262 -2.761*** -2.577*** 
 (0.05) (0.50) (3.83) (3.23) 
Border 1.298*** 1.313*** 2.237*** 2.272*** 
 (3.49) (3.53) (6.71) (6.71) 
Log(Subsidyi(t+1))  0.00767   
  (0.11)   
Log(Livestock_Subsidyi(t+1))    -0.0203 
     (1.34) 
Number of Observations 26186 24014 11236 9160 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.502 0.500 0.352 0.356 
Gravity Equation Includes     
      ajt Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      bi  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      crt Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ajt, bi, and crt denote for importer year 
fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed effects respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Effects of Subsidies on Exports over Different Farm Bills 
Dependent Variable Farm Bill 1996 Farm Bill 2002 Farm Bill 2008 
Log(Farm Exportsit) 0.151** 0.153** 0.125** 
 (2.55) (2.46) (1.97) 
Log(Agricultural Exportsit) 0.122* 0.115* 0.0873 
 (1.93) (1.75) (1.29) 
Log (Livestock Exportsit) -0.0650*** 0.0113 -0.0134 
  (2.77) (0.78) (0.48) 
Number of Observations    
Adjusted R-squared    
Gravity Equation Includes    
      ajt Yes Yes Yes 
      bi  
      crt 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. To save space, we suppress the 
coefficient estimates of the same control variables. They are, however, available from the authors upon 
request. ajt, bi, and crt denote for importer year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed 
effects respectively. 
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 Appendix Table A2.1: Farm Resource Regions 
FRR 
codes 
FRR Name States Main Features 
1 Heartland 
Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, 
Illinois, Missouri 
-    Most farms (22%) 
-    Highest production value (23%), largest 
cropland area 
-    Cash grain and cattle farms 
2 Northern Crescent 
New Hampshire, 
Connecticut,  
Wisconsin, Maine, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, 
Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Michigan,  
Vermont, Pennsylvania 
-    Most populous region 
-    15% of farms, 15% of production, 9% 
of cropland 
-    Dairy, general crop, and cash grain 
farms 
3 Northern Great Plain  
-    Largest farms and smallest population 
-    5% of farms, 6% of production value, 
17% of cropland 
-    Wheat, cattle, and sheep farms 
4 Prairie Gateway 
Oklahoma, Texas, New 
Mexico, Kansas, 
Nebraska 
-    Second largest in wheat, oats, barley, 
rice and cotton production 
-    13% of farms, 12% of production, 17% 
of cropland 
-    Cattle, wheat, sorghum, rice and cotton 
farms 
5 Eastern Upland  
West Virginia, 
Arkansas, Tennessee, 
Kentucky 
-    Largest share of small farms 
-    15% of farms, 5% of production value, 
6% of cropland 
-    Part-time cattle, tobacco, and poultry 
farms 
6 Southern Seaboard 
South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Maryland, 
Georgia, Alabama,  
Virginia, Delaware 
-    Both small and larger farms 
-    11% of farms, 9% of production value, 
6% of cropland 
-    Part-time cattle, general field crops, and 
poultry farms 
7 Fruitful Rim Oregon, Idaho,  Florida, -    Highest proportion of large and very 
62 
California, Arizona, 
Washington 
large farms 
-    10% of farms, 22% of production value, 
8% of cropland 
-    Farms growing fruit, vegetables, 
nursery, and cotton. 
8 Basin and Range  
Colorado, Nevada, 
Montana, Utah 
-    4% of farms, 4% of  production value, 
4% of cropland 
-    Cattle, wheat and sorghum farms 
9 Mississippi Portal Mississippi, Louisiana 
-    Highest proportion of both small and 
larger farms 
-    5% of farms, 4% of production value, 
5% of cropland 
-    Cotton, rice, poultry, and hog farms 
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Appendix Table A2.2: Impact of Subsidy on Exports (Overall Subsidy and Subsidy by Category) 
Outcome Variable Explanatory Variable of Interest (1) (2) Note 
               ↓         ↓    
 Log(Subsidyit) 0.167*** 0.146** Table 2.2 column (3) 
  (2.65) (2.38)  
 Log(Commodityit) 0.117** 0.0952* Table 2.3A column (1) 
  (2.36) (1.94)  
 Log(Disasterit) 0.0277** 0.0260*  
  (2.01) (1.89)  
Log(Farm Exportit) Log(Conservation Reserveit) -0.0605 -0.0549  
  (1.61) (1.47)  
Log(Crop Insuranceit) -0.204*** -0.192***  
  (2.76) (2.60)  
 Log(Sub_Amberit) 0.0837** 0.0772** Table 2.3B column (1) 
  (2.14) (1.98)  
 Log(Sub_Greenit)   0.0411 0.0266  
    (0.85) (0.56)   
Log(Agricultural Exportit) Log(Agricultural Subsidyit) 0.145** 0.129* Table 2.5 column (1) 
   (2.14) (1.95)   
Log(Livestock Exportit) Log( Livestock Subsidyit) -0.0157 -0.0185 Table 2.5 column (3) 
  (1.33) (1.55)  
 Log(Subsidyit)  0.132** Table 2.2 column (3) 
   (2.15)  
 Log(Commodityit)  0.0899* Table 2.3A column (1) 
   (1.83)  
 Log(Disasterit)  0.0257*  
   (1.86)  
 Log(Conservation Reserveit)  -0.0610  
     (1.62)   
Log (Farm Exportit/GDPit) Log(Crop Insuranceit)  -0.197***  
   (2.66)  
 Log(Sub_Amberit)  0.0768** Table 2.3B column (1) 
   (1.97)  
 Log(Sub_Greenit)  0.00874  
   (0.18)  
Gravity Equation Includes     
 Log(GDPit)  Yes No  
Log(GDPCit)  Yes No  
Other Control Variables  Yes Yes   
      ajt  Yes Yes  
      bi   Yes Yes  
      crt  Yes Yes  
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ajt, bi, and crt denote for importer year 
fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed effects respectively. 
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Appendix Table A2.3: Impact of DP on Exports  
Outcome Variable Explanatory Variable of Interest (1) (2) Note 
               ↓         ↓    
 Log(DPit) -0.0402 -0.108 Table 2.4 column 3 
  (0.32) (0.87)  
 Log(Subsidyit-DPit) 0.120** 0.112**  
  (2.38) (2.27)  
 Log(DPit) -0.0425 -0.112 Table 2.4 column 6 
  (0.33) (0.9)  
 Log(Sub_Amberit) 0.0816** 0.0750*  
  (2.07) (1.91)  
Log(Farm Exportit) Log(Sub_Green2it) -0.00224 0.0025  
  (0.07) (0.08)  
 Log(DPit)  0.675 Table 2.4 column 7 
   (0.97)  
 Log (Subsidyit-DPit)  0.119**  
   (2.37)  
 Log(DPit)*Log(GDPit)  -0.06  
   (1.03)  
 Log(DPit)  0.774 Table 2.4 column 8 
   (1.11)  
 Log(Sub_Amberit)  0.0838**  
   (2.13)  
 Log(Sub_Greenit)  -0.00221  
   (0.07)  
 Log(DPit)*Log(GDPit)  -0.0685  
   (1.18)  
 Log(DPit)  -0.0943 Table 2.4 column 3 
   (0.76)  
 Log (Subsidyit-DPit)  0.104**  
   (2.1)  
 Log(DPit)  -0.1 Table 2.4 column 6 
   (0.8)  
 Log(Sub_Amberit)  0.0752*  
   (1.92)  
Log (Farm Exportit/GDPit) Log(Sub_Greenit)  -0.00793  
      (0.25)   
Gravity Equation Includes     
      Log(GDPit)  Yes No  
      Log(GDPCit)  Yes No  
      Other Control Variables  Yes Yes  
      ajt  Yes Yes  
      bi   Yes Yes  
      crt   Yes Yes   
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ajt, bi, and crt denote for importer year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by year fixed 
effects respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
Impact of Farm Subsidies on Farm Imports: Does Farm 
Heterogeneity Matter? 
3.1.  Introduction 
Trade barriers have been substantially brought down through a series of international 
trade talks and negotiations since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
in 1947 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement in 1995. However, 
agriculture remains highly protected due to its extremely contentious and complex 
features. Average tariffs on agricultural products are 62% while the figure for industrial 
goods is only 4% (Beierle, 2002). In addition, the export subsidies and domestic 
subsidies that have been frequently implemented by developed countries29 distort trade in 
a way that favors domestic production and exports over imported goods. Subsidies create 
an unfair playground as it disadvantages producers in poor countries for whom 
agriculture is a main livelihood. Further, discipline in subsidies is important as they may 
become an alternative tool when agricultural tariff barriers are brought down to conform 
to other sectors (Anderson and Martin, 2005). 
Studies on the impact of subsidies on international trade mostly focus on their 
impact on exports, leaving the question of the impact on imports open.30 This chapter 
fills this gap by analyzing the effect of US farm subsidies on its agricultural imports. 
Together with the previous chapter that assesses the impact of farm subsidies on US 
                                                 
29 88% of the total support coming from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, while the remaining proportion is granted by some developing countries (Hoekman et 
al., 2004). 
30 See section 1 in chapter 1 for a review of existing studies on related topics. 
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agricultural exports, we aim to offer a complete picture of the trade impact of US farm 
subsidies. Although the US is a net exporter and its imports are relatively small compared 
to its exports, the US is still the world’s largest importer in the agricultural sector, 
suggesting that it is important to understand the effect of subsidies on its imports. 
As farm subsidies promote domestic production, the extra production may result 
in export-promotion or import-substitution. Similar to chapter 1, in this chapter we 
employ the gravity model to investigate the impact of subsidy on agricultural imports by 
utilizing variation at the state level. We further strengthen the identification by pointing 
out which programs are the main sources of distortion. We investigate the most important 
programs in which subsidy payments are linked to market price. These programs include 
loan deficiency payment (LDP), marketing loan gain (MLG), commodity certificate 
(CC), and counter-cyclical payment (CCP). We also evaluate the effect of other payments 
not directly related to market condition, including direct payment (DP), crop insurance, 
disaster, and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  
Furthermore, we also shed light on the farm subsidy effect when controlling for 
the fact that states are likely to differ in terms of farm size and farm productivity and that 
the effect of government payments on production and hence trade varies with farm size. 
If farmers have decreasing absolute risk aversion, larger and wealthier farms may 
consume more risk and expand their production more than their counterparts with the 
same level of transfer. This effect normally happens when payments are decoupled such 
as Direct Payment DP; that is, farmers do not need to engage in production to receive 
payments.31 For coupled programs whose calculation is based on current production, 
                                                 
31 Goodwin and Mishra (2005) find that larger farms significantly allocate more funds from decoupled 
payments to farm work.  
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larger farms may have higher capacity (e.g., credit easement) to expand their production 
to get larger payments than small farms. For these reasons, it is likely that subsidies 
promote production to a varying extent across farm size and hence may impede imports 
in the same manner.  This investigation also provides useful insight into a potential 
channel of subsidy effect through large vs. small farms and, therefore, provides an 
implication for policy makers on the issue of how to minimize the distorting effect of 
subsidies on production and trade. 
We carefully take into account the problem of frequent zero trade flows, which 
has captured significant attention in recent studies on estimating the gravity model. 
Estimating the gravity model in log form by ordinary least squares (OLS) ignores all the 
information contained in zero observations and, thus, biases the estimate (Martin and 
Pham, 2008; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The 
problem of censoring is especially important in our sample because it contains a large 
proportion of censored observations (62%). The information from these observations 
would be discarded if we use OLS with a truncated sample. The kernel density function 
of imports (in log form) exhibits roughly a censored normal distribution, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.5. We therefore employ the Eaton-Tamura (ET) tobit estimation to address the 
problem of censoring. 
Our results document that the subsidy effect mainly comes from price-contingent 
programs such as LDP, MLG, CC, and even the “decoupled” program, CCP, while for 
programs that do not interfere with market conditions, including DP, crop insurance, 
disaster, and CRP, the effect is small and insignificant.  In addition, the effect is stronger 
for large farms than their smaller counterparts for most programs. Even with programs 
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that are not price-contingent, including DP, disaster, crop insurance, and CRP, the effect 
through large farms exists, though not large or strongly statistically significant. 
We proceed as follows. Section 3.2 describes important features of individual 
programs. Section 3.3 provides information on data sources and descriptive statistics 
while the following section presents econometric specifications. Empirical results are 
analyzed in section 3.5 while section 3.6 checks the robustness of estimations. The 
chapter ends with the conclusion. 
3.2.  Farm Subsidy Programs 
This section provides a detailed description of MLG, CC, and LDP while information 
about other programs, including DP, CCP, crop insurance, disaster, and CRP, can be 
found in section 3.2. 
Marketing loans (MLG, CC, and LDP) offer interim financing and additional 
income when market conditions are poor. The purpose of loan assistance programs is to 
provide farmers with short-term financial support to cover their expenses when market 
prices are low at harvest time. Farmers use their commodities as collateral for the loans 
and can either pay their loan or forfeit the commodities when the loan expires in March 
or May of the following year. When the county posted price (local market price) is below 
the predetermined loan rate, farmers can receive MLG equal to their production quantity 
multiplied by the difference of the loan rate and county posted price if they pay the 
principal at that time. Instead of paying the principal to receive the payment, farmers can 
buy certificates for their commodities and take CC payment. The only difference between 
MLG and CC is that the payment for MLG is limited while there is no limit for CC. 
Farmers can register for LDPs when market prices are lower than the loan rate if they 
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forgo the loans. Marketing assistance loans are criticized as they are tied to current 
production and intervene in market conditions by ensuring minimum revenue (equal to 
revenue associated with the loan rate). Marketing assistance loans distort production and 
trade; for example, when market prices fall below the loan rate, the supply curve will 
kink at the loan rate (Westcott, year). 
3.3.  Data Description and Descriptive Statistics 
While the data on US state exports are available from 1999 through 2011, state-level 
annual imports are recorded for only four years from 2008 through 2011. Thus, analysis 
of the subsidy effects of imports could be carried out with a panel of 45 US states and 
their 100 biggest trading partners over only four years. The short span of the panel data 
with a relatively large number of individual states may prevent us from utilizing the 
within-state variation effectively. The import equation uses the same set of covariates as 
the export equation but we use the variation from pooled data rather than within-state 
data. To proxy for the farm size variable, we use the number of subsidy recipients whose 
data source is the same as the subsidy value.  A detailed description of the data source is 
presented in chapter 1, section 2. 
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of subsidy receipts. Almost half of the states 
(23) receive less than $200 million annually. Meanwhile, 13 out of 45 states are granted 
from $200 million to just more than $400 million. The number of states that receive 
subsidies continues to decrease when the level of payments increases, leaving only three 
states receiving the maximum subsidy level from $900 million to $1,300 million. 
Likewise, substantial variation in subsidy payments across states is depicted in Figure 
3.2. Each year Rhode Island received the modest amount of $1.43 million while Texas 
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was awarded $1,324.8 million. In addition, New Hampshire, Nevada, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts received approximately $32.4 million per annum, making up only the tiny 
proportion of 0.25% of the total subsidy granted. In contrast, only three states (Illinois, 
Iowa, and Texas) top the list and together make up the lion’s share of 26.6% ($3,438.7 
million/year). However, the farm average of log(subsidy) is the smallest for these states 
due to the large number of subsidy recipients. In contrast, New Hampshire, Nevada, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have the largest farm average of 
log(subsidy). The variation in the average of log(subsidy) across states is shown in 
Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates a strong variation of annual import values across states. A 
negative relationship between import values and subsidy payments is observed from 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. For example, the first group (states with code from 1 to 8) receives a 
relatively small amount of subsidies compared with the second (with code from 9 to 17). 
At the same time, the first group includes states with substantially high amount of 
imports (Arizona, California, and Florida) while imports from the second group are 
consistently lower. 
3.4.  Econometric Specification 
Similar to the export equation in chapter 2, a gravity model is used to investigate the 
impact of farm subsidies on import flows. However, one difference from the export 
equation is that the panel data for the import equation span only four years while having 
a relatively large number of individuals (46 states). For this type of panel, the fixed 
effects estimation might produce large standard errors, as mentioned by a number of 
economists, including Clark and Linder (2012). This happens for our sample as most 
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fixed effects estimates except some for country-pair variables have large variance and 
hence become statistically insignificant. We therefore adopt pooled OLS estimates for 
the import equation instead of the fixed effects model. One potential weakness of pooled 
OLS in this case is that it might be biased.  Subsidy payments are likely to have a 
positive correlation with state permanent characteristics, as we analyze and show 
evidence of in chapter 2. If states that are permanently prosperous in agricultural 
development receive more subsidy and impede imports more (due to better domestic 
production) at the same time, not controlling for permanent differences would bias the 
estimate upward.  However, as analyzed and evidenced from regression results in chapter 
1, the positive joint determination of the state specific-effect and subsidy on production 
and export mostly occur with programs tied to historical production and not linked to 
current market conditions, like DP. The regression results in Table 2.4 (chapter 2) 
support our argument that the upward bias caused by failing to allow for time-invariant 
state heterogeneity (i.e. failing to include the state dummies) applies mostly to DP. 
Hence, we should keep this caveat in mind when explaining the estimate of DP and 
possibly CCP. In addition, given that a large number of US states has zero imports, the 
problem of zero imports must be tackled to accurately identify the effect of US subsidy 
payments on US state imports. 
3.4.1. A Large Fraction of Zero Import Flows 
For the import equation, it is worth noting that a large proportion, 62%, of import flows 
is censored. Zero trade flows can be a result of a missing value, a data recording error, or 
an actual absence of a trading relationship. Trade resistance helps to explain a lack of 
trading activity between a pair of countries. Ignoring zero observations by estimating 
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truncated OLS, thus, may result in a very misleading inference as pointed out by a 
number of researchers (Martin and Pham, 2008; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008; 
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).  
We use a framework developed by Tobin (1958) to tackle the occurrence of zero 
imports. This method, which is widely used in wage studies, is especially suited for 
regressions with limited dependent variables.32 Note that the density function of 
log(import) in our sample, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, reveals a censored dependent 
variable. However, the related literature has emphasized the importance of estimating the 
censored point instead of using a zero censored point. Specifically, Carson and Sun 
(2007) argue that Tobit estimates may be inconsistent if zero is chosen as the censored 
point while this parameter is different from zero and unknown. Thus, we follow Martin 
and Pham (2008) by employing the Tobit estimator a la Eaton-Tamura (1994) where the 
censored point (A) is estimated jointly with other Tobit coefficient estimates. Our base 
line gravity equation is as follow:   
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where t denotes the year; ijtV  is import value of state i from exporter j in year t. itsubsidy  
is subsidy granted by state i in year t; ijcedis tan  is flight distance between the capital 
city of the US state i to that of its trading partner j. itGDP  is states’ gross domestic 
                                                 
32 New trade models such as Helpman et al. (2008), which sets up a theoretical model of firm 
heterogeneity, provide an alternative explanation of the asymmetric zero trade flows as a result of a firm 
not being productive enough to have positive exports to a destination. As a result, these models suggest the 
estimation of the gravity equation á la Heckman. We choose not to estimate the gravity equation of US 
state imports using the Heckman estimator because no valid excluded restriction variable is available for 
that purpose.  
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product. ijlandborder  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if state i and exporter j share a land 
border and zero otherwise; icoastline  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for states having a 
coastline and zero otherwise. In the gravity regressions above, ajt are included to control 
for importer-year-specific effects and capture characteristics of the importer side. rtc  is 
region-by-year dummies where the region is a farm resource region (FRR)33 constructed 
by the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA).  ijtu  is composite error.
34 In 
brief, given the short time span of the data of US state imports, we use the same 
specification as in chapter 1 but without the state fixed effects. 
3.4.2. Subsidy Effects: Small vs. Large Farms 
In our case, the subsidy effect may be largely different across states that differ in the 
level of farm productivity. For example, the wealth effect of subsidy indicates that with 
the same subsidy rate wealthier farms may consume more risk and expand their 
production to a larger extent if their risk aversion is decreasing. Conversely, financial 
constraints may be tighter for smaller farms, suggesting that loan programs may be more 
effective among these farms than their lager farm counterparts. We investigate whether 
the effect of subsidy on imports differs between states due to differences in average farm 
size among those that receive subsidies. Larger farms receive more subsidy as most 
important programs are paid on farms’ production or revenue; thus, the subsidy that 
farms receive largely reflects the general scale of their farm operations (MacDonald, 
2011).35 On the other hand, large farms in US agricultural production commonly have 
                                                 
33 For a detailed description of FRR, see chapter 1.4 and Appendix Table A1. 
34 The specification has a number of advantages; see section 1.4 for analysis. 
35 This attribute is well recognized and one of the points criticized by subsidy opponents as the primary 
purpose of subsidy is to support income for a typical farmer but these payments end up going to large 
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greater cost advantages or higher productivity than small farms (MacDonald et al., 2005). 
These reasons lead us to choose the average of farm subsidy to proxy for farm 
productivity (among farms that receive subsidies) at the state level.  
We use the average of log(subsidy) by dividing log(subsidy) by number of farms 
receiving subsidy ( nr ) to proxy for farm size or farm productivity at the state level and 
include this term as in gravity specification (2). With measure of farm size (proxied by 
average of log(subsidy)) included, we could test if heterogeneity in farms’ response to 
subsidies exists. I substantiate equation (2) in answering the question by incorporating 
interaction term between subsidy and subsidy average into the model as in equation (3).     
Negative sign of subsidy average or interaction term implies that the bigger the farms 
are, the larger the effect on production subsidies generate, and hence impedes imports to 
a larger extent. 
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3.5.  Results and Analysis 
3.5.1. Impact of Farm Subsidies on Agricultural Imports  
Table 3.2 presents estimates of gravity specification (1) for individual programs.  CCP is 
only triggered when market prices are low, so it is unknown to producers at cropping 
time. We follow Goodwin and Mishra (2006) by using the previous year’s CCP to form 
                                                                                                                                               
farms, contributing to higher average household income among this group than the nationwide average 
household income (Monke, 2008). 
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farmers’ expectation about payment in the current year. Likewise, LDP, MLG, and CC 
are triggered when the market price is below the country posted price, which is unknown 
to producers until harvest time, so we also use payment in the previous year in estimating 
the effect of US subsidy payments. As stimulation of these programs depends on market 
price, they largely vary over time and contain zero observations. As log of zero is 
undefined and ignoring these observations may cause bias, so we account for zero 
payment in two ways. First, after taking the log we assign undefined observations with 
zero value.36 In a second way, we treat these variables as indicators where positive 
payments take a value 1 and 0 otherwise. Because estimates of individual programs 
provide understanding about the impact in detail while total subsidies can verify the 
impact at a more aggregated level, we present the results for individual programs before 
total subsidies 
In Table 3.2, the estimate of price-contingent programs (Loan Deficiency 
Payment, Marketing Loan Gain, Commodity Certificate, and Counter Cyclical Payment) 
with continuous value is presented in panel A while those using indicators are arranged 
in panel B. The results for non-price-contingent payments are reported in Panel C. To see 
the impact of censoring problem, OLS estimates are reported first followed by ET tobit 
in the next column for each of these programs. The results show that price-related 
programs have a consistent effect on imports. In addition, the censoring problem affects 
LDP and CCP as estimates of these programs decrease from -0.104 to -0.084 and from -
0.061 to -0.042, respectively. Meanwhile, censoring almost causes no changes in 
estimates of MLG and CC. One explanation for the difference is that LDP and CCP also 
                                                 
36 The results are exactly the same if we add 1 into each observation before taking the log.  We leave the 
scenario where information in zero payments is disregarded for the robustness check. 
77 
influence the margin of imports (probability to change from positive imports to zero 
imports) to a larger extent than the other price-contingent programs. LDP has the largest 
effect on imports followed by CCP while MLG and CC impede imports to a lesser 
extent. However, note that estimates of CCP may be upwardly biased as this program is 
paid on historical production and we do not control for permanent differences between 
states. Estimates using payment indicators are largely consistent with those using 
continuous value of payments. Meanwhile, non-price-contingent programs, including 
DP, crop insurance, disaster, and CRP, do not have any impact on imports; estimates of 
these programs are small and not different from zero.  
In Table 3.3 we report estimates for the effect of total farm subsidies on imports. 
Although the effect is strong and significant for price-related programs, it does not show 
up in total subsidies for either OLS or ET tobit estimates (columns 1 and 2). The effect of 
aggregated subsidies is likely driven by non-price-related programs as these programs 
account for 88.5% of the total subsidies. We therefore run another regression where total 
subsidies are divided into price-related programs in one part and the other part is the sum 
of the remaining subsidies (or sum of non-price-related programs). The price-related 
programs then are allowed to lag one period for the same reason as for each individual 
program. Estimates with only the price-contingent program included are presented in 
columns 3 and 4 while estimates with both parts are in columns 5 and 6. The results show 
what we predict in that price contingent programs have a negative effect at a strong 
significant level while non-price-contingent programs have no effect on imports. 
 Note that the results consistently show that the censoring point is estimated at 
0.009 and different from zero at a strong statistically significant level. As export value is 
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measured in million US dollars, the estimate of censoring point means that the cut-off 
point of trade between a state and a partner is around 9000 US dollars. This result shows 
that using zero as the censoring point may bias the estimate. The above zero cutoff point 
indicates that trade between a pair of countries can be observed only when the value of 
trade exceeds a positive value. This also can be attributable to measurement error in that 
small import flows are coded as zero. This type of measurement error is not rare as data 
are at the state level. 
3.5.2.Impact of Farm Subsidies on Agricultural Imports: Small vs. Large Farms 
Table 3.4 reports the estimates of gravity specifications (2) and (3) to explore potential 
mechanisms through which subsidies affect imports. Coefficients of subsidy programs 
are largely the same in size and statistically significant as shown in Table 3.3. Price-
contingent programs have a negative and significant impact on imports while no effect is 
shown for their counterpart. Furthermore, the larger the average farm size of a state, the 
stronger the negative effect that subsidies generate. This can be seen as the coefficient of 
lfarm_subavr (gravity specification (2)) is negative and strongly significant for all 
individual programs. Similarly, the coefficient of interaction between subsidy programs 
with lfarm_subavr is also negative and significant for almost all programs. As in gravity 
specification (1), the censoring point is estimated the same at 0.009 with only a slight 
difference in standard error in both gravity specifications (2) and (3) for all programs. 
In general, the regression results show that programs related to current production 
decisions and/or market conditions, including LDP, MLG, CC, and CCP, are the source 
of import impediments. In addition, the effect increases with size of farm. This finding 
supports the argument that the wealth effect is a channel that the government’s payments 
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affect on the supply side. However, the coefficient of interaction term is small for all 
programs. Hence, the effect of the non-price-related programs, including DP, crop 
insurance, disaster, and CRP, is small. For example, calculation at the mean value of the 
subsidy average yields an estimate of 0.006 for DP.  
3.6.  Robustness Checks 
First, as in the export equation, we check the robustness of results with the Bergstrand 
(1989) theoretical framework by including log(GDPC). As the primary purpose of 
subsidies is to boost low income, they may target states with low GDPC. If so, not 
controlling for GDPC may bias estimates. The ET tobit estimate for gravity 
specifications (1) through (3) is presented in Table 3.5 for overall subsidies and 
individual programs. The results are largely consistent with those in the main analysis 
with estimates slightly smaller in size. 
Second, for each individual program estimation, we include in the model the 
remaining program calculated by subtracting that program from the total subsidy. The 
results for gravity specifications (1)-(3), as shown in Table 3.6, largely confirm our 
estimation results in the main analysis. 
Finally, we re-estimate gravity specifications (1) through (3) without using 
information in zero subsidy payments. The estimates presented in Table 3.7 confirm the 
results in the main analysis, with the magnitude of the effect of price contingent 
programs being even larger. For scenarios where farm size is accumulated, the estimated 
effect of non-linear terms (average of log(subsidy program) and interaction between this 
value and log(subsidy program)), except for some cases, is confirmed.  
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3.7.  Conclusions 
This chapter evaluates the impact of farm subsidies on imports to provide more 
understanding about the effect of subsidies on international trade at the aggregate level. 
Due to a short time period of import data, we are not able to use the fixed effects as in the 
exports analysis in chapter 1. Given the evidence from chapter 1 that state-specific 
factors have a correlation with subsidy programs that are paid on historical production 
and change little over time, the potential bias caused by failing to control for state 
permanent differences most likely happens for DP and, to a lesser extent, CCP. Another 
important point in the estimation approach is that a large proportion of imports is zero 
and not accounting for zero information may bias estimates, as indicated in the literature. 
We therefore estimate the gravity model using ET tobit for which the threshold is 
estimated together with structural parameters instead of taking a zero value as given. 
Along with estimating the effect of subsidies, we also investigate a potential channel 
through which subsidies affect imports. The marginal effect of subsidies on production 
and trade may vary according to farm size and/or farm productivity due to the wealth 
effect or coupling effect (ability to expand production to obtain more payments). We 
therefore include the average of log(subsidies), which is likely to have a positive 
correlation with farm size/farm productivity among farms that receive payments.  
Our results reveal that subsidies have obvious negative effects on imports. 
Although the effect is not as large as on exports, it is statistically significant. The main 
source of the effect is programs which link to market price and current production, 
including Marketing Loan Gain, Commodity Certificate, and Loan Deficiency Payment. 
However, Counter Cyclical Payment, a price-contingent program, divorcing from current 
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production decisions has a high impact on imports. Even so, the actual effect may be 
somewhat lower as we noted earlier that estimates of this program can be upward biased 
if state-specific differences are not controlled for. In addition, large farm size is 
associated with higher impact on imports. This effect is not large, though it is strongly 
statistically significant and found for most programs. Non-price-contingent programs, 
including Direct Payment, crop insurance, disaster, and Conservation Reserve Program, 
only have a small impact on imports via large farms.  
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3.9. Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Subsidy Receipts 
 
Figure 3.2: Annual Subsidy Receipts Across States 
 
Figure 3.3: Annual Farm Imports Across States 
 
Figure 3.4: Farm Average of Log(Subsidy) 
 
Figure 3.5:  Distribution of Log(Import Value) 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
     
 Mean/sd Min Max Observation 
Log(Farm Importsijt) 4.898 0 21.47 18000 
 (6.485)    
Log(Farm Subsidiesit) 18.57 12.20 21.07 18000 
 (1.714)    
Average of Log(Farm Subsidiesit) 0.00842 0.000168 0.210 18000 
 (0.0246)    
Log(LDPi(t-1))  11.05 0 16.94 13500 
 (3.345)    
Log(MLGi(t-1)) 2.221 0 15.95 13500 
 (4.641)    
Log(CCi(t-1)) 3.030 0 18.03 13500 
 (5.974)    
log(CCPi(t-1)) 6.908 0 19.59 13500 
 (7.940)    
Log(Crop Insurancei(t-1)) 17.20 10.77 20.28 18000 
 (2.053)    
Log(Disasteri(t-1)) 15.69 9.224 19.52 18000 
 (1.950)    
Log(CRPi(t-1)) 16.60 0 19.32 18000 
 (2.694)    
Note: LDP, MLG, CC, CRP stand for Loan Deficiency Payment, Marketing Loan Gain, Commodity 
Certificate, and Conservation Reserve Program respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Impact of Total Subsidies on Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS ET-Tobit OLS ET-Tobit OLS ET-Tobit 
Log(Subsidyit) 0.019 -0.008     
 (0.37) (0.15)     
Log(Price Contingent Programsi(t-1))    -0.119*** -0.099*** -0.135*** -0.109*** 
   (6.42) (6.11) (7.05) (6.65) 
Log(Non Price Contingent Programsit)     0.134*** 0.110** 
     (2.59) (2.19) 
Log(Distanceij) -2.084*** -1.575*** -2.007*** -1.521*** -2.045*** -1.555*** 
 (5.04) (6.14) (4.80) (5.83) (4.90) (5.92) 
Log(GDPit) 2.369*** 1.816*** 2.547*** 1.952*** 2.456*** 1.880*** 
 (27.50) (24.05) (35.19) (30.45) (29.10) (24.21) 
Borderi 1.353 1.726*** 1.494* 1.825*** 1.460* 1.792*** 
 (1.57) (2.66) (1.72) (2.85) (1.67) (2.76) 
Coastlinei 0.656*** 0.400** 0.273 0.090 0.490** 0.264 
 (2.98) (2.03) (1.51) (0.57) (2.35) (1.36) 
A  0.009***  0.009***  0.009*** 
  (14.37)  (13.43)  (13.41) 
Number of Observations 18000 18000 13500 13500 13500 13500 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.567  0.571  0.571  
Log likelihood  -1424.798  -1058.829  -1052.297 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, or *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels, respectively. A is denoted for censored point estimate. 
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Table 3.5: ET-Tobit Estimate for Generalized Gravity Equation 
Panel A: Price Contingent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LDP LDP LDP MLG MLG MLG 
Log(Subsidy Programi(t-1))  -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.071*** -0.016 -0.015 -0.028* 
 (5.43) (6.02) (5.39) (1.56) (1.50) (1.88) 
Average Log(Subsidiesit)  -10.082***   -8.827***  
  (4.22)   (3.76)  
Log(Subsidy Programit)*   -1.038***   10.094 
Average Log(Subsidyit)   (2.99)   (1.47) 
Panel A: Price Contingent  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CC CC CC CCP CCP CCP 
Log(Subsidy Programi(t-1))  -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (3.06) (2.80) (2.78) (3.64) (2.97) (2.82) 
Average Log(Subsidiesit)  -8.575***   -7.551***  
  (3.65)   (3.16)  
Log(Subsidy Programit)*   6.622   -2.332 
Average Log(Subsidyit)   (1.03)   (1.10) 
Panel B: Price Contingent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LDP LDP MLG MLG CC CC 
Subsidy Program -0.966*** -0.958*** -0.212* -0.207* -0.340*** -0.312** 
 (6.70) (6.71) (1.87) (1.83) (2.76) (2.53) 
Average Log(Subsidiesit)  -8.742***  -8.836***  -8.632*** 
  (3.70)  (3.76)  (3.68) 
Panel B: Price Contingent (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CCP CCP CRP CRP   
Subsidy Program -0.336*** -0.262** 0.459** -0.299   
 (2.72) (2.05) (1.97) (1.25)   
Average Log(Subsidiesit)  -8.158***  -10.038***   
  (3.44)  (3.67)   
Panel C: Subsidy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DP DP DP Crop Crop Crop 
Log(Subsidy Programit) 0.038 -0.033 -0.029 0.081* 0.026 0.033 
 (0.90) (0.71) (0.60) (1.91) (0.57) (0.70) 
Average Log(Subsidiesit)  -10.265***   -8.182***  
  (3.71)   (3.15)  
Log(Subsidy Programit)*   -0.853***   -0.586** 
Average Log(Subsidyit)   (2.91)   (2.52) 
Panel C: Subsidy (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Disaster Disaster Disaster CRP CRP CRP 
Log(Subsidy Programit) 0.050 0.015 0.018 0.026 -0.022 0.015 
 (1.15) (0.35) (0.43) (1.56) (1.13) (0.97) 
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Average Log(Subsidiesit)  -8.725***   -10.620***  
  (3.47)   (3.65)  
Log(Subsidy Programit)*   -0.646***   -0.729*** 
Average Log(Subsidyit)   (3.14)   (3.31) 
Panel D: Total Subsidies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log(Subsidy Programi(t-1))  -0.093*** -0.096*** -0.091***    
 (5.45) (5.62) (5.31)    
Average log(Subsidiesit)  -9.396***     
  (3.97)     
Log(Subsidy Programit)*   -0.964***    
Average Log(Subsidyit)   (2.79)    
Panel D: Total Subsidies (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
Log(Subsidy Programi(t-1))  -0.093*** -0.096*** -0.091***    
 (5.45) (5.62) (5.31)    
Average log(Subsidiesit)  -9.396***     
  (3.97)     
Log(Subsidy Programit)*   -0.964***    
Average Log(Subsidyit)   (2.79)    
       
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, or *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, or 1% levels, respectively. A is denoted for censored point estimate. 
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Table 3.7: Disregarding Zero Subsidies 
Panel A: Total Subsidies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Subsidy Program)  -0.103*** -0.120*** -0.116***  -0.155*** -0.198*** 
 (4.41) (5.17) (5.00)  (2.97) (3.30) 
Average Log(Subsidies)  -10.186***   614.097***  
  (3.38)   (4.09)  
Log(Subsidy Program)*   -1.057**   44.868*** 
Average Log(Subsidy)   (2.27)   (4.04) 
Panel A: Total Subsidies (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log(Subsidy Program)     -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.120*** 
    (4.65) (4.92) (5.10) 
Average Log(Subsidies)     93.077**  
     (2.19)  
Log(Subsidy Program)*      6.608** 
Average Log(Subsidy)      (2.32) 
Panel B: Non Price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DP DP DP CR CR CR 
Log(Subsidy Program) 0.025 -0.042 -0.029 0.058 0.004 0.016 
 (0.63) (0.92) (0.62) (1.41) (0.10) (0.36) 
Average Log(Subsidies  -9.723***   -8.012***  
  (3.60)   (3.12)  
Log(Subsidy Program)*   -0.689**   -0.502** 
Average Log(Subsidy)   (2.39)   (2.17) 
Panel B: Non Price (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log(Subsidy Program) 0.012 -0.023 -0.019 0.014 -0.047 -0.040 
 (0.30) (0.62) (0.50) (0.37) (1.15) (0.99) 
Average Log(Subsidies  -8.651***   -11.096***  
  (3.51)   (3.37)  
Log(Subsidy Program)*   -0.611***   -0.795*** 
Average Log(Subsidy)   (3.02)   (3.04) 
       
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, or *** indicates significance at 
the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels, respectively.  is denoted for censored point estimate. 
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Chapter 4 
Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Exports of Cotton: Do the Cotton 
Dispute and the WTO Settlement Matter? 
4.1.  Introduction 
Although cotton accounts for a tiny proportion of income for developed countries, it is 
an important tradable commodity among less developed economies. For example, cotton 
amounts to 30% of the total exports of four West African nations: Benin, Burkina, Chad, 
and Mali. Revenue from cotton makes up a large proportion of income for millions of 
poor farmers in that region (Minotand and Daniels, 2001, cited in Sumner, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the income for the poor from cotton revenues has been shrinking as a 
consequence of consistently low cotton world prices, which are induced by highly 
distorting cotton subsidization undertaken by developed nations. Hence, the cotton 
subsidies and particularly their distorting effect on cotton exports and production have 
caused a huge debate among World Trade Organization (WTO) members in the context 
of Doha Development Agenda (DDA). US domestic support for cotton has been brought 
before the WTO Panel from 2002 and is an ongoing challenge highlighting that cotton 
subsidization and policy reform are an extremely contentious issue. 
In the strand of literature on our topic of interest, the price effect of subsidies on 
cotton’s world price has been well documented in Goreux (2003), Sumner (2003b), 
Alston and Brunke (2006), and Anderson and Valenzuela (2006). The magnitude of the 
price effect is controversial and largely depends on cotton supply and demand 
elasticities, although generally estimates lie between 12% and 16% of the typical values 
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of assumed elasticities. In addition, Goreux (2003) points out that once cotton subsidies 
by the US, European Union (EU), and China are eliminated, US cotton production will 
drop 16.2%. Sumner (2003b) uses a multi-country and multi-commodity simulation 
framework to evaluate the impact of US cotton subsidies on domestic production and 
export of this commodity. When domestic and export subsidies for cotton are 
completely removed, cotton output decreases 26.3%-27.4% while its export falls by 
41.2%-43%. Anderson and Valenzuela (2006) report that the removal of domestic 
subsidies has a major impact on the world cotton price and welfare gain (almost 90%), 
leaving the impact of removing the tariff and export subsidy small at 10%. This is a 
distinguishing feature of cotton in that the overall agriculture domestic subsidization has 
a relatively small impact (5%) compared with tariffs (93%) (Anderson, Martin, and 
Valenzuela, 2006).  
The key objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of cotton subsidy on 
cotton exports over the period from 2002 to 2012. We exploit a strong variation in 
subsidy payments across states (see Figure 4.3) and within states over time to quantify 
the effect by using a modern gravity model. Figures 4.4-4.6 illustrate within-state 
variation over the sample period for Texas, for which the subsidy payment is largest, for 
Arizona with support in the middle range, and New Mexico whose payment is at the 
bottom among states with positive subsidy receipt. The strong variation of subsidy 
payments across states and within states over a reasonably long time allows us to 
quantify the effect of subsidy on exports. The US as the world’s largest subsidizer for 
cotton, the third largest producer (behind China and India), and the leading exporter of 
this commodity suggests that understanding the impact of its subsidization on exports is 
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important for trade negotiators and policy makers in the context of the WTO settlement 
process.  
The major contribution of this study to the existing literature is that it offers an 
analysis of the impact of US cotton subsidies on cotton exports when US subsidy policy 
for cotton is subjected to change under WTO’s resolution process. More importantly, we 
address the problem of expectation error when identifying the effect. Expectation error 
or attenuation bias is the result of the differences between observed subsidy payments 
and farmers’ expectation about program payments. It may arise due to several program 
payments that hinge on market price at harvest time, which is unknown to producers at 
planting time, including counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) (or average crop revenue 
elections (ACAEs) from Farm Bill 2008), and marketing assistance loans. The 
expectation error from this source is highlighted in Kirwan (2007), Robert, Kirwan, and 
Hopkins (2003), and Goodwin and Mishra (2006). Kirwan (2007) and Robert, Kirwan, 
and Hopkins  (2003) employ instrumental variable to address the expectation error while 
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) use past payments for payments in the current year.  Apart 
from this source of expectation error, another type of expectation error arises for the 
case of cotton. The US cotton subsidy is under threat of reform in the WTO settlement 
process, generating uncertainty about cotton subsidization in the coming years. These 
factors suggest that farmers’ expected subsidy payment, which drives their cotton 
production decision, may differ from actual government payments. Among studies that 
assess the impact of cotton subsidies on trade, Sumner (2003b) comes close to our 
approach in that he takes into account the problem of expectation error caused by an 
unknown rate stimulation of program payments by using the weighted average of actual 
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market price in the past to represent cotton growers’ expectation (same as Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2006).  
However, expectation error from the second source is scant in Sumner (2003b). 
The approach using past payments for the current year’s payments for price-contingent 
programs is unlikely to be appropriate in a circumstance when expectation error from 
the two sources is mixed, as in our case. For example, confronted with the information 
from the WTO panel that ruled against the most important US subsidy provision, 
including marketing loan gains, CCPs, and export credit guarantee (GSM-102 program) 
in December 2007, farmers may expect that these programs would be removed and no 
longer apply in the renewed Farm Bill 2008. In this case, using subsidies in 2007 for 
payment expectation in 2008 can lead to a very misleading inference. Follow Robert, 
Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) and Kirwan (2009), we utilize the specialty of subsidy 
payments in 1997 as an instrument to overcome the problem of expectation error.  
Our regression results document that for years that the subsidy policy for cotton 
is stable and not likely to change, payments for cotton hugely promote its exports while 
in the periods that subsidy policy is under pressure or likely to change, the effect drops 
and become statistically insignificant. In particular, a 1% increase in cotton subsidy 
payments results in a 2.1% increase in its cotton exports for 2002-2003, before any 
information about the legal challenge is perceived. During 2004-2010, when the future 
policy for cotton is gloomy, the estimates generally decrease and lose their significance. 
The effect recovers to a strong level in 2011 (0.94) when the current subsidy policy is 
ensured through the mutual agreement between US and Brazil. On the other hand, due to 
a threat of removal from the list of major crops in the renewed Farm Bill 2013, which 
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indicated in the Senate-passed and House-passed proposed changes for cotton 
subsidization, the impact of the cotton subsidy on US cotton exports in 2002-2012 is 
weaker and not statistically significant.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
the US subsidization policy and cotton legal dispute, followed by data and descriptive 
statistics. The empirical framework and identification strategy are presented in section 4 
while results are analyzed in the following section. Finally, section 7 concludes this 
paper. 
4.2.  Institutional Background 
4.2.1. Overview of US Subsidization for Cotton 
US subsidization for major crops, including cotton, has a long history since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Since then, subsidization policies have encountered a number 
of challenges to meet the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO 
disciplines. The FAIR Act of 1996 shifted subsidy programs toward “decoupled” 
payments that support farmers based on their historical production. From 1998 to 2000, 
however, a drop in market price triggered a new support called market loss assistance 
payment and this payment lasted through 2001 for cotton. Consequently, subsidy 
payments surged after 1999 and, for the first time, have gone far beyond the A-Index37 
since then (see Figure 4.1). The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI 
Act) and the following farm bills in 2008 officially continued this payment under the 
name counter cyclical payment, which grants subsidies on farmers’ historical production 
                                                 
37 The A-Index is the average of the five lowest priced types of 1-3/32-inch staple length cotton on the 
European market from 1990 through 2008 and in Far Est markets in 2009. 
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when the market price falls below the price set in the statute. Farm Bill 2008 introduced 
ACAE to ensure minimum revenue for major commodities, including cotton. ACAE is 
triggered when the national price and state yield of cotton fall below a certain threshold. 
Producers can opt only for either ACAE or CCP. 
Following Kirwan (2009), we model the estimate of subsidy payments for cotton in 
recent decades using the formula: 
)1(.. ititittititit rgzsaysubsidy  O  
where itsubsidy is the subsidy payment for state i in year t. The first component is 
obtained from summing the subsidy payments across farms used in Kirwan38 (2009). 
This formula presents an estimate of decoupled payments, including DP and CCP (or 
market loss assistance payment in 1998-2001 or ACAE in 2008-2011). In this term, tO is 
a scaling factor; iy is the average cotton yield in the period 1980-1984; ita is the number 
of acres called base acres that qualify for subsidy and participate in year t; ts is the 
national subsidy rate for cotton in year t. ts is predetermined and set in the farm bills for 
DP while it depends on market price and is unknown until harvest time for CCP (or 
market loss assistance payment in 1998-2001 or ACAE in 2008-2011). As Kirwan 
(2009) models land subsidy while our data reflect total farm subsidy, we include the 
second component which represents payment that is based on current production. This 
term is used for payments, including marketing assistance loans (loan deficiency 
payment, marketing loan gain, and commodity certificate). In this term, itz and itg  are 
cotton yield and base acres in the current year. Meanwhile, itr is the subsidy rate in year 
                                                 
38 The exact formula in Kirwan is for farm i and crop j, at year t; 1jtijtijtjijt saysubsidy O . 
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t, which hinges on the market price and is unknown to producers until marketing time. 
The rate may differ across states as it depends on the posted county price of cotton. Due 
to strong persistence of climate patterns, characteristics of soil topology, and even 
cropping traditions, it is likely that the current yield is highly correlated to the past yield. 
Therefore, itz can be written as iit yx .  and (1) becomes: 
)2()..( ititittittiit rgxsaysubsidy  O  
which is much the same as the formulation in Kirwan (2009) in that payments across 
time  share the same deterministic component. 
4.2.2. Brazil’s Challenges of US Cotton Subsidies at the WTO 
Cotton payments during 1999-2001 were valued at $4 billion, making them double the 
1992 benchmark, and violated Article 13 of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture.39 
Brazil, a leading cotton producer and exporter, officially challenged US cotton subsidies 
with the WTO in the fall of 2002. Beside prohibited export subsidies, US production 
subsidies for cotton are alleged to distort the cotton world trade and harm other cotton 
exporters, mainly by depressing world prices and allowing the US a larger market share 
than it would have otherwise (Sumner, 2005). Brazil claimed that US cotton subsidies 
had a distorting effect on the cotton world prices in 1999-2002 and threaten to have the 
same effect in the future (Sumner, 2005). 
After two years, in the fall of 2004, the WTO panel ruled that provisions of the domestic 
subsidy such as CCP and price-related programs for cotton violated the WTO agreement 
                                                 
39According to Article 13, domestic support measures that complied with the requirements of the 
Agreement on Agriculture in that the level of support for a commodity remained at or below the 
benchmark 1992 marketing year (MY) levels are exempted from being challenged as illegal subsidies 
through dispute settlement processing. 
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on agricultural subsidy. Also, US step-two payments and agricultural export credit 
guarantees are among the prohibited export subsidies under the WTO disciplines. These 
programs are highly likely to distort international trade and hence should be withdrawn. 
In 2005, the US changed the GSM-102 programs and step-two payments, leaving 
domestic subsidy payments unchanged. Brazil, however, argued that the US response 
was inadequate and pursued the complaint. The WTO panel ruling against the US was 
publicly released in December 2007, and the ruling was upheld on appeal in June 2008. 
In August 2009, a WTO arbitration panel allowed retaliation in that Brazil was 
authorized to impose trade countermeasures on the US. This retaliation includes a fixed 
annual payment of $147.3 million and a variable annual amount based on US GSM-102 
program spending. Furthermore, cross-retaliation may also apply in the US copyright 
and patent areas. To avoid the threat of retaliation, the US and Brazil entered a 
temporary mutual agreement in June 2010. The agreement includes (1) US annual 
payments of $147.3 million to the Brazilian Cotton Institute to provide technical support 
to Brazil’s cotton industry, (2) regular discussions on limits of the US trade-distorting 
subsidy for cotton, and (3) modifications to the GSM-102 guarantee followed by semi-
annual reviews. The actual changes for cotton subsidization necessary to limit its 
distortion on trade, as in (2) above, however, would not be implemented until the next 
farm bill, not earlier than 2012. Furthermore, proposed changes for cotton subsidization 
were agreed upon in both the Senate-passed and House-passed Farm Bill 2013. The key 
point of those proposed changes included removing cotton from the list of major 
commodities that receive price and income support. Instead, a stand-alone, county-based 
revenue insurance policy called the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) would be 
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delivered. The mutual agreement and proposed changes in US cotton policy since 2010 
are more adequate, significant, and generate more firmness and validity than the changes 
in 2005. This implies that the US response in this period reduced the expectation error 
from uncertainty of policy changes to a larger extent than the 2005 changes. 
4.3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Chapters 2 and 3 use export and import data of 46 US states40 and their 100 biggest 
trading partners, which accounts for 98% of the US total trade (sum of imports and 
exports). However, with respect to cotton, only 16 states grow this commodity and 
accordingly receive subsidies for the whole period (2002-2012) while the rest does not 
receive payment in all years.41 This is because cotton is a special crop and requires 
specific conditions to develop. Some states receive no cotton support but have positive 
export values during the sample period. This happens as cotton exports encompass all 
primary and processed cotton products. Some states do not grow cotton but can import 
raw cotton from other states and export processed and other cotton-based products. 
Nonetheless, the export value from non-production states accounts for only 2.8%. Thus, 
in our analysis, the sample is restricted to 16 states with positive cotton receipt. 
Cotton export data are extracted from the Harmonized System at the 6-digit level 
from USA Trade Online. Data on domestic subsidies per annum for each state are 
obtained from the Farm Subsidy Database of the Environmental Working Group 
                                                 
40 Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia are excluded from the 
sample as their trade flows are negligible. These regions together account for less than 2% of the total US 
cotton trade value. 
41 This should happen with a longer time before our sample started, at least from 1980 and if a state grew 
cotton from this year onward PFC or DP should be positive. 
103 
(EWG).42 In the model, we control for standard gravity variables, including gross 
domestic product (GDP), whose data are collected from the US Department of 
Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Data on land borders and coastlines of US 
states are collected from online sources such as Reference. Finally, the bilateral distance 
between one state and its trading partner is the flight distance between the two 
corresponding capital cities and represent transaction cost calculated by the author using 
the website Worldatlas.  
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in Table 4.1. On average, 
states that receive subsidies annually export approximate $3.4 million of cotton 
products. The value of the average cotton subsidy is $126.14 million which is more than 
37 times higher than value of cotton exports In addition, states receiving the largest 
amount of support include Texas with annual payment of $687 million, Mississippi with 
$269 million, and California with two-thirds of Mississippi’s payment. Likewise, the 
annual export value among these states is double the average level of all 16 states. The 
subsidy granted also differs across years. For instance, the average subsidy payment is 
almost eight times higher in 2005 than in 2012. In short, statistics show that cotton 
exports and subsidy payments differ substantially across states and time and that a 
positive association exists between cotton subsidy receipts and its export values. 
4.4. Empirical Strategy—Identification 
4.4.1. Unobserved Heterogeneity 
To evaluate the impact of cotton subsidy on export, I use the gravity model as follows: 
                                                 
42 The EWG database can be accessed via the following link: farm.ewg.org  
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where ijtV  is export value from state i to importer j in year t. 
*
itsubsidy  is the variable of 
interest representing the expected subsidy value granted to state i in year t. This figure is 
likely to differ from actual government payment, which we denote as subsidyit. ijtZ  is a 
vector of standard gravity variables as described.43 The vector of importer-year 
interactions, ajt, is used to account for importers’ characteristics over time.44 More 
importantly, state dummies are included to capture productivity-related factors which 
might be associated with both subsidy payments and cotton export capability. This is 
because US geography is diversified, so several states are blessed with climate patterns 
and soil topology which is more suitable and favorable for agricultural production than 
others. Furthermore, subsidy programs paid on historical production such as DP vary 
little over time, making them highly correlated with state permanent characteristics. 
State-specific dummies also capture the potential endogeneity of the subsidy in case the 
federal government sets export achievement as a hidden target behind the visible target 
of supporting farmers’ income.45 In both these possibilities, the effect of the cotton 
subsidy is likely to be biased upward as these unobservable factors have a positive 
correlation with both the cotton subsidy payments and cotton’s exports. Recall that in 
chapter 1 when state specific factors are controlled for, the effect of subsidy declines 
more than five times and DP is the main source of this reduction. Similar to chapter 1, 
                                                 
43 When state-specific factors are included, coastline is dropped from this vector due to multi-collinearity. 
44 This releases the demand for using data on basic gravity model variables, especially data on the subsidy 
granted by importer countries whose quality and credibility are questionable due to a number of missing 
observations and inaccurate notifications (Nuetah et al., 2011). Adding these dummies also addresses the 
problem of “multilateral resistance” from the importer side, which will bias gravity coefficient estimates if 
not accounted for (see Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004, for a discussion). 
45 Like the vector of importer year interaction, this set of dummies reduces the multilateral resistance from 
the state side. 
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we also include region-year interactions as subsidies for cotton, including programs that 
may share common factors for states within a region. For example, natural disasters or 
pet disease, when happens, seem to affect a whole region, including states near each 
other rather than individual states. Such incidents influence both subsidy payments such 
as disaster payments and crop insurance and export at the same time. In addition they 
also capture any spillover effect within a region which may result from interstate trade 
and re-exports. This manifests in our sample as several states have positive export 
values while they do not produce cotton at all. 
4.4.2. Expectation Error 
The most significant obstacle in identifying the effect of the cotton subsidies on cotton 
exports is the attenuation bias. This type of bias can come from two sources. First, the 
cotton dispute and WTO settlement may have an impact on farmers’ perspective on the 
cotton subsidy in the investigated period. Second, with Farm Bill 2002, although 
subsidy rates are set in the legislation, the actual rate of payments for a number of 
programs, including marketing assistance loans, CCP, and ACAE, is not determined 
until the harvest time. The contingency of payment on market conditions at harvest time 
and the uncertainty regarding the policy changes due to the WTO settlement would 
likely result in expectation error. Producers do not know the next year’s payment at the 
time of cultivation. Their expectation about the support itself would drive their 
incentives for cotton growing. If producers have a gloomy prediction about the cotton 
subsidization policy, they would probably shift to other more compelling commodities. 
Otherwise, they would engage in cotton cropping and/or expand their production. The 
observed cotton government payment, thus, would likely differ from farmers’ 
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expectation, resulting in errors-in-variables problem. Actual cotton subsidy payments 
will equal the expected government payment and the expectation error; that is, 
)3(* gititit subsidysubsidy H  
Similar to Kirwan (2009), we also assume that the expected subsidy and the expectation 
error are uncorrelated; that is, 0),( *  gisitsubsidyCov H  for all t; s implies that using the 
observed government payment instead of expected payments would lead to the problem 
of classical errors-in-variables problem, namely, attenuation bias. This would bias 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates downward when the expected sign is positive, as 
in this situation (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 75). Robert, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) and 
Kirwan (2009) utilize a unique structure of subsidy payment in 1997 to address the 
problem of error-in-variables; 1997 was the first year when the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) Act of 1996 broke the link between subsidy 
payments to current production and market price. Because payments in 1997 came from 
Production Flexibility Contract for which the rate is predetermined in the FAIR Act 
1996, 1997 payment should contain little or no expectation error (from second source in 
our category, Robert, Kirwan, and Hopkins , 2003; Kirwan, 2009). According to Robert, 
Kirwan, and Hopkins 2003 and Kirwan 2009), another characteristic of this variable that 
makes it a qualified instrument is that subsidy payments in the period were estimated 
with the same deterministic component iy  as in equation (1). In our case, this variable 
should not bear expectation error from the first source as it was five years prior to the 
cotton case’s initiation and it correlated with subsidy payments in other years through 
the deterministic component iy  as in equation (2). We therefore use the same 
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instrumental variable, subsidy payments in 1997, to address the problem of expectation 
error as in Robert, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) and Kirwan (2009).  
Our interest is to estimate the effect over time when subsidy policy for cotton is 
subjected to change. The changes in policy may happen some time after the cotton case 
was legally brought to WTO and processed by the panel. The expectation of cotton 
growers about subsidy payments and subsidy policy may change according to the 
information updated from the WTO settlement process. Thus the effect we estimate in 
this context is immediate effect rather than the long term effect. In order to estimate the 
effect over time, we take the first difference of gravity equation (2) with 2002 as base 
year, while the final year is any year from 2003 to 2012. Although fixed-effects and 
first-differencing can both technically remove bias due to unobserved state 
heterogeneity, recall that the other important obstacle in estimating the effect is the 
attenuation bias, for which we use an external IV to address. The IV is only for one year 
(subsidy payments in 1997), so this variable can be applied in a first-difference equation 
but not fixed effects which contain at least two different years. Therefore, our first 
estimation procedure is to first-difference equation (2) to obtain equation (3)46 in order 
                                                 
46 It is worth highlighting that equation (3) absorbs all exporter-importer-specific factors along with 
distance and land border. For example, this vector of dummies takes into account potential omitted 
variables such as an export subsidy, which is substantially used in the case of cotton in the investigated 
period. It is likely that the export subsidy has a positive correlation with the domestic subsidy. This 
correlation stems from the fact that the export subsidy can be used as a means to push extra production 
resulting from a domestic subsidy into the world market (Chokeman, Francis, and Olarreaga, 2004). An 
export subsidy is often offered in the form of export tax reduction/exemptions, support for product 
marketing, or entitlement to credit access. An export subsidy is normally destination-specific as it targets 
importers with the most potential. The targeted export subsidy destinations may be changed over time, 
although this is rare. So, the export subsidy can be considered a pair-specific variable and that is why it 
can be captured by the vector of state-importer dummies. If so, not controlling for this omitted variable 
would lead to an upwardly biased estimate of the subsidy effect. Furthermore, the set of exporter-importer 
dummies also tackles the problem of multilateral resistance related to the pair of countries in the sample. 
Finally, note that the tariff is not included in the model as our data are at the state level, so the tariff for a 
given destination and year is the same for all states. In addition, any variation in the tariff is partially 
captured by the importer-year and exporter-importer fixed effect. 
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to remove bias from unobserved state heterogeneity, and then apply IV-2SLS to address 
the attenuation bias. 
 4)()()( * ijiirjij GDPLnsubsidyLncaVLn HED ''' '  
 
Expected and actual payment differences for 2002 and year t (with t from 2002 
to 2012) can be written as giii subsidysubsidy 2002,
*
2002,2002, H and
g
ititit subsidysubsidy H * . Substituting each of these two years in equation (3) yields the 
estimating equation for the period from 2002 to year t as: 
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So far we have indicated that our preferred estimator is the 2SLS using IV for 
first differenced equation (4) or (5). It is important for us to stress that both first 
differencing and IV are equally important and need to be used together in our estimation 
procedure. The 1997 subsidy payments is a qualified instrument to address the problem 
of error-in-variables only when state permanent differences are removed. This means 
that the variable is unlikely to be a good IV for specifications without controlling for 
state-specific factors or for cross-sectional analysis. As in equation (2), if state fixed 
effects ib  is not controlled for, the composite error can be presented as ijtiijt bu H . As 
a large part of the 1997 subsidy payments come from PFC, which paid on historical 
production, it should have a high correlation with state fixed effects ib  and hence 
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become endogenous itself. According to Woodridge (2002, p. 102), two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimators when the instrumental variable is endogenous have plim:47 
 > @),(),(lim 199719972 tlsubsidyusls lsubsidylsubsidyCorrulsubsidyCorrp tVVD   
Meanwhile, OLS has plim: 
  ),(lim ulsubsidyCorrp ttlsubsidyuOLS VVD   
Therefore, if payments in year t and 1997 have a high correlation with each other and 
both have a high correlation with the state fixed effects ib , as in this case, 2SLS and 
OLS estimators can be similar in a finite sample. It means that IV would not work well 
in detecting and addressing attenuation bias if we use it for a pooled or cross sectional 
estimate. 
4.5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
4.5.1. Impact of Cotton Subsidies on US Cotton Exports 
We highlighted in the previous section that IV estimation is a good candidate for 
minimizing the attenuation bias only when state permanent differences are removed. To 
demonstrate the importance of environment for which IV estimation works well, we first 
present OLS and IV estimates for cross sectional estimate for each year from 2002 
through 2012 using specification (2) without state-specific dummies. As seen from 
Table 4.2 Panel A, the estimate of subsidy is consistently high from 0.47 to 0.92 and 
strongly significant at the 1% level. IV estimates are very similar to OLS estimates, 
implying that error-in-variables is not a problem or that the IV fails to detect it. We 
favor the second possibility as we point out in the previous section that the similarity of 
                                                 
47 Note that in the formulas for plim2sls and plimOLS u is short for uijt.  
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OLS and IV estimates might result from the fact that IV does not perform well in cross-
sectional estimate as it correlates with omitted state-specific factors in the error term. In 
addition, partial R-squared (and hence F-statistics) from the first stage is incredibly high, 
indicating that payments in 1997 and other years are substantially correlated (93% to 
99% for most years). The correlation almost reaching 100% for most years is too high as 
PFC accounted for most of the payment in 1997 while for other years, payments which 
hinge on current market conditions and production contribute to around half of total 
payments. It is likely that they have such a high correlation because they both highly 
correlate with state permanent characteristics which are not accounted for in cross-
sectional estimates. 
Next we take advantage of the nature of longitudinal data to minimize the 
problem of simultaneity and omitted variables (unobserved state heterogeneity), 
allowing an environment for which IV might be powerful in addressing the problem of 
error-in-variables. In Table 4.3, we report estimates for all periods from 2002 to year t 
with t from 2003 through 2012. Panel A reports pooled the OLS for each of these 
periods. Although our preferred specification is 2SLS for first-differenced equation (5), 
we also report the estimation results for both fixed effects (FE) and first-difference 
estimate (FD) (between year t and 2002) to see how simultaneity bias the estimate. The 
results for FE and FD are presented in panels B and C, respectively while our preferred 
specification, first-difference with IV estimate (FDIV) is in panel D. Similar to cross 
sectional estimate in Table 4.2 Panel A, the effect from pooled OLS estimators is high 
and strongly significant at 1% level for all periods. When state-specific factors are 
accounted for, FE and FD immediately drop in size, lose their statistical significance for 
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almost all periods, and have negative sign in several cases. This movement is consistent 
with what we predict before in that subsidy payments, especially PFC and DP, have a 
positive correlation with permanent state characteristics. However, when the problem of 
error-in-variables exists, FE and FD tend to be downwardly biased toward zero as 
indicated by econometrics lecture. When IV is used to address the problem of error-in-
variables, estimates for all periods become positive, larger though only statistically 
significant sometimes. It is worth highlighting that partial R-squared from the first stage 
after netting out state-specific factors reduces almost 10 times in size, verifying our 
earlier projection that the subsidies in year 1997 and from 2002 to 2012 have a high 
correlation with state permanent characteristics. Nonetheless, the correlation between 
these subsidy payments is high, with F-statistics strongly rejecting the null hypothesis at 
the 1% level in all cases, suggesting that the IV is sufficiently strong. 
We can observe an interesting pattern of the subsidy effect from FD with IV. The 
effect is largest at 2.1 and strongly significant for 2002-2003. Recall that the cotton case 
is initiated in late 2002; thus, the information that the cotton subsidy policy is legally 
challenged and might be subjected to reform is unlikely to be publicly recognized and to 
cause adverse effects on producers’ decisions in the cotton cultivation time in March and 
June for 2003. In addition, the very high effect of subsidies found for this period can be 
explained by an increasing trend of cotton subsidies from 1998-2001 (Figure 4.2). It is 
also clear from Figure 4.2 that price-support programs that hinge on market conditions 
and are unknown to producers at cultivation time (payments subjected to error-in-
variables from first source), including market loss assistance, MLG, CC, and LDP, 
continue to increase and get extremely large in 2001. If farmers expect payments of 
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these programs in this year (2002 or 2003) to continue the trend in recent years, the 
effect of subsidies on production should be large, as we observed. In 2004, however, 
when producers for the first time are hit by the bad news, they may react too strongly, 
making the effect reduce nine times in size. However, from 2005 to 2010 (except 2008), 
it seems that producers adapted their behavior based on the fact that the US government 
had taken series of actions to protect domestic producers and that it may take a long time 
for the WTO legal process to be settled. The effect in these periods recovers with 
magnitude from 0.68 to 1.5 though is only statistically significant for 2009. The only 
difference in this period is a very low estimate in 2008 of 0.22 (with t-statistic=0.3). As 
2008 is the time for the farm bill to be renewed, farmers’ concern about disadvantageous 
changes in cotton subsidies in a complicated situation when subsidization policy for 
cotton is under pressure to reform is understandable. The US-Brazil mutual agreement in 
2010 confirms that actual changes would not occur until Farm Bill 2008 due in 2012 
provides a guaranty about subsidy payments in 2011. The effect in a given year is high 
at 0.94 and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, when the time for 
disadvantageous proposed changes (Senate-passed and House-passed proposal in 2010 
that cotton be removed from eligible crops in the renewed farm bill) was nearing and 
Farm Bill 2008 was due in 2012, the magnitude of the subsidy effect drops more than 
half and loses its significance. 
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4.5.2. Potential Explanation for Cotton Growers’ Behavior in a Changing Context 
Cotton Subsidy Policy 
From 2004 to 2010, the subsidy policy for cotton confronts disadvantages and is under 
pressure to reform while in 2002, 2003, and 2011 there is insurance on subsidy 
payments. Accordingly, we find a large reduction in the subsidy effect when the subsidy 
policy in the foreseeable future is gloomy. A common behavior of cotton growers is that 
they shift their production toward other crops in 2004-2010. We test this possibility by 
estimating the effect of farm subsidies on exports after subtracting the total value of 
subsidies and exports for cotton. As for agricultural products without cotton, with only 
an expectation error from the first source (subsidy rates are unknown to producers at 
harvest time), we estimate specification (2) and use payments in the past for producers’ 
expectation in the current year (similar to Goodwin and Mishra, 2006, and Sumner, 
2003b). The estimate in Table 4.4 columns (1) through (3) allows information in the 
previous one, two, and three to represent current payments. The results in columns (2) 
and (3) show that s from 2004-2010 when uncertainty and disadvantages about future 
policy changes for cotton exist, the effect of subsidies on agricultural exports (excluding 
cotton) is stronger than in the other years. The results support our prediction that during 
2004-2010, cotton growers shifted their production toward safer commodities. 
4.5.3. A Robustness Check 
As in Deadroff’s (1985) theoretical framework, GDP per capita (GDPC) represents a 
specialization in production (i.e. whether production is labor-intensive or capital-
intensive). GDPC, on the other hand, may have a potential correlation with the subsidy 
level. This correlation may be negative if the US farm bills aim to support poor farmers, 
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for example. Thus, to see whether estimates of subsidy coefficients are driven by 
omitting this variable, we include it in the model. The results with GDPC included are 
reported in Table 4.5 and are largely the same, indicating that the effect is deemed 
robust to this version of the gravity model.  
4.6. Conclusions 
Cotton is one of the commodities that has received the largest amount of support in 
industrialized countries. This crop makes up a tiny fraction of the rich countries’ income 
while it constitutes a meaningful proportion of GDP and is the most important cash crop 
for a number of the least developed countries, especially those in West and Central 
Africa. As the world’s third largest producer and the leading exporter of cotton, the US 
has given a huge amount of support to domestic cotton growers, which is believed to 
have suppressed the world price by stimulating excessive production. In addition, no 
reduction has been introduced in the level of support through the renewed farm bills in 
recent decades when agricultural subsidization had was brought into GATT rounds. 
Thus, US cotton subsidization has given rise to extreme debate. The policy ended up 
being challenged at the WTO by Brazil in 2002 when the US subsidization policy for 
cotton no longer could seek protection from the WTO, and the settlement process was 
long lasting. In this context, a study on the impact of cotton subsidization on US exports 
is crucial. This study provides insight into these effects for the period when the debate 
and its resolution were still alive. We address the problem of error-in-variables from 
program payments that are unknown to producers at cultivation time and from 
expectations of when the policy is likely to change. We report a large effect of cotton 
subsidization on US cotton exports in the period for which subsidy policy for cotton is 
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stable and secured. US cotton exports would shrink at double the rate of subsidy 
reduction in the pre-challenged period or at almost an equal rate in 2011 when the 
validity of the current subsidy policy was stated in the US-Brazil mutual agreement 
signed in late 2010. The effect is two to five times larger than that found in Sumner 
(2003b). This is likely because we address the problem of expectation error caused by 
uncertainty of the subsidy policy. Compared with the effect of subsidies on agricultural 
export value in chapter 1, the effect is 10-15 times higher for cotton. Our finding is in 
line with Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela (2006), who they report that the welfare 
impact of cotton subsidies is 9 times higher than that from tariff and export subsidies 
while the size of the impact is around 1/19 for agricultural commodities. Nonetheless, 
from 2004-2010 when cotton was officially challenged and the dispute was ongoing, the 
effect went down significantly and lost significance in most years except 2009. In 
addition, the effect dropped most substantially in years when producers were first hit by 
the bad information (2004) and when current farm bills are due and ready to be renewed 
(2008, 2012). The evidence suggests that producers shift their production toward safer 
crops in the period when cotton policy is gloomy. 
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4.8. Tables and Figures for Chapter 4 
Figure 4.1: USDA Cotton Support 1992-2010 
 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service (Schnepf, 
2010) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Cotton Subsidy Trend Before 
2002-2003  
Source: Environmental Working Group 
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Figure 4.3: Cotton Subsidy among States with 
Positive Payment 
 
Figure 4.4: Cotton Subsidy for Texas over Time 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Cotton Subsidy for Arizona over 
Time 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Cotton Subsidy for New Mexico over 
Time 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 2002-2012 
 Log(Cotton Exportsijt) Log(Cotton Subsidiesit) 
Time Mean/sd Min Max N Mean/sd Min Max N 
From 3399367.3 0 1.08998e+09 17600 126139001.0 1691584.8 1189801088 17600 
 (26233929.1)    (183627906.1)    
Year 1997     17.22 14.88 19.51 1600 
     (1.172)    
Year 2002 12.91 7.945 19.84 661 17.98 15.73 20.34 1600 
 (2.531)    (1.272)    
Year 2003 13.08 7.914 20.06 643 18.42 16.64 20.57 1600 
 (2.649)    (1.058)    
Year 2004 13.17 7.879 20.53 627 18.19 16.20 20.38 1600 
 (2.698)    (1.170)    
Year 2005 12.98 7.824 20.46 583 18.57 16.49 20.90 1600 
 (2.751)    (1.230)    
Year 2006 13.05 7.844 20.64 607 18.40 16.41 20.68 1600 
 (2.693)    (1.154)    
Year 2007 13.12 7.780 20.20 674 18.18 16.20 20.47 1600 
 (2.674)    (1.199)    
Year 2008 13.05 7.767 20.39 656 17.79 15.89 20.02 1600 
 (2.670)    (1.071)    
Year 2009 12.86 7.762 19.65 652 18.14 16.19 20.35 1600 
 (2.629)    (1.092)    
Year 2010 13.02 7.781 20.47 660 17.13 15.18 19.59 1600 
 (2.792)    (1.103)    
Year 2011 13.34 7.720 20.81 637 17.43 15.52 20.15 1600 
 (2.929)    (1.088)    
Year 2012 13.11 7.710 20.51 614 16.17 14.34 19.55 1600 
 (2.778)    (1.189)    
Note: Descriptive statistics are calculated for 16 states with positive subsidy payments. 
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Table 4.4: Potential Explanation for Cotton Growers During the Sample Period 
  FE  
Dependent Variable→ Log(Farm Log(Farm Log(Farm 
Log(Distanceij) -2.165*** -2.101*** -2.072*** 
 (7.82) (7.57) (7.38) 
Log(GDPit) 0.322 0.244 -0.564 
 (0.47) (0.29) (0.57) 
Borderi 0.491 0.504 0.500 
 (0.97) (1.01) (0.99) 
Log(Subsidiesi(t-1)) in years 2002, 2003, and 2011 0.332*** 0.068 0.184 
 (3.11) (0.38) (0.74) 
Log(Subsidiesi(t-1)) in years from 2004-2010 0.323*** 0.310** 0.368** 
 (2.98) (2.16) (2.20) 
Log(Subsidiesi(t-2)) in years 2002, 2003, and 2011  0.176 0.438 
  (0.75) (1.51) 
Log(Subsidiesi(t-2)) in years from 2004-2010  -0.010 0.128 
  (0.08) (0.83) 
Log(Subsidiesi(t-3)) in years 2002, 2003, and 2011   -0.274 
   (0.63) 
Log(Subsidiesi(t-3)) in years from 2004-2010   -0.087 
   (0.72) 
Number of Observations 18446 16624 14714 
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.418 0.418 
Notes: Robust standard errors are exporter-importer clustered. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
This dissertation empirically examines the impact of US farm subsidies on its farm trade 
by utilizing the variation between states and within state over the sample period 1999 to 
2012. The disciplines for farm subsidies were a central point for discussion at Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) among the WTO members. It is crucial to enhance the 
understanding of the trade effects of US domestic farm subsidies in the context in which 
the debate on subsidy disciplines is ongoing, because, on the one hand, the US is the 
world leading user of subsidies with its subsidy payments exceeding production value in 
many years, and on the other hand, it is the largest exporter and importer in the 
agricultural sector raising concerns about the profound impact of its subsidies on the 
world prices as well as the  trade of other countries.   
In chapter 2 I investigate the impact of US farm subsidies on its farm exports 
(agricultural plus livestock product exports). I employ the gravity model using data on 
exports between 46 states and their 100 biggest trading partners for period from 1999 to 
2011.  Simultaneity bias or state unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be profound in 
this case due to high correlation between programs that are paid on historical production 
and state permanent characteristics. I therefore use state fixed effects to remove any 
permanent state differences. The results show a positive and meaningful effect of US 
farm subsidies on its farm exports: with 1% increase in subsidies, export value of the 
farm products increases by 0.15%. In addition, commodity programs and programs 
whose payments link to market price and/or current production, and programs that 
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belong to “amber box” under the WTO regulations are the main source of export 
promotion. One exceptional case is crop insurance whose payment is linked to current 
production and assigned to amber box, but the results show no effect on export. 
Meanwhile the programs which are not tied to production and current market condition 
or categorized in “green box” including Direct Payment, disaster payment, an 
Conservation Reserve Program do not have any effect on exports. 
To draw a more complete picture of the effects of farm subsidies on farm trade, 
in chapter 3 I assess the impact of subsidies on farm imports. The gravity used in chapter 
2 is similar to that in chapter 1 except that I use pooled OLS instead of fixed effects as 
the data for imports are available for only four years from 2008-2011. We employ the 
Eaton-Tamura tobit estimation to estimate the subsidy effects, because the proportion of 
zero imports is large and the distribution of imports is likely to be censored. The 
estimates show that farm subsidies have negative impact on farm imports. The 
magnitude of the effect of subsidies on imports, though not as strong as on exports, is 
meaningful and significant. Similar to results in chapter 1, programs that are linked to 
market price and current production, including Loan Deficiency Payment, Marketing 
Loan Gain, Commodity Certificate, and Counter Cyclical Payment are the main drivers 
of the effect. The estimate in the ET-tobit is from -0.026 to -0.084 for price contingent 
programs. As in chapter 2, crop insurance also does not have impact on imports. The 
remaining programs including Direct Payment, disaster payment, and Conservation 
Reserve Program again show no impact on imports. In addition we find that the impact 
of subsidies on imports is higher for large farms compared with small farms indicating 
farm heterogeneity in responding to government payments. 
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Finally, in chapter 4 I evaluate the impact of cotton subsidies on cotton exports 
in the sample period of 2002 to 2012. Cotton is one of the crops that receive the largest 
subsidy payments in the US. With US topping list of major cotton producers in the 
world, its cotton subsidization program has been subject to dispute at the WTO (for 
example, Brazil challenged the US cotton subsidies in 2002). In the context in which the 
WTO settlement is ongoing, the expectation error or attenuation bias, which is the 
difference between farmers’ expectation about payments and actual payments, is likely 
to be profound. Our strategy in identifying the effect is therefore to use an instrumental 
variable in a first difference equation. The results show that in the period when subsidy 
policy for cotton is stable, as in 2002-2003, when cotton case was not perceived, or in 
2011 when US-Brazil mutual agreement confirmed the validity of current subsidy policy 
for cotton, the effect is large and significant at 2.09 and 0.937 respectively. By contrast, 
in the period when the subsidy policy for cotton is under threat to reform, the effect 
generally drops in size and loses its significance. In addition, in this period, when cotton 
subsidy policy is gloomy cotton growers are likely to shift to other safer crops. 
In short, throughout the three essays in this thesis, I find that US farm subsidies 
have meaningful impact on its farm trade. The findings from this dissertation may 
provide implication for policy makers and trade negotiators in the WTO about 
disciplines for domestic subsidies.  
 
